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PRIVATE ORDERING AND PUBLIC ENERGY 
INNOVATION POLICY 
DANIEL R. CAHOY* & LELAND GLENNA**
ABSTRACT
 Nascent development in alternative energy technologies can be 
greatly affected by intellectual property environments. Tight control 
over foundational patent rights by a few companies can hold up com-
mercialization. Conversely, widely dispersed ownership can create 
thickets that discourage innovation investment ex ante. Given the 
high-technology nature of the most promising alternative energy pro-
posals, such intellectual property impacts are of great concern. This 
Article considers the issue in the specific context of the most widely 
used alternative fuel source—ethanol-based biofuels. It finds that the 
ownership environment is quite diverse and theoretically ripe for a so-
called anticommons effect. However, using analogies to general agri-
cultural biotechnology, this Article demonstrates that the biofuel pa-
tent environment is likely to undergo a striking transformation 
through the effects of private ordering. It articulates a general model 
of ordering behavior and suggests the most important conditions that 
facilitate ordering in particular industries. This Article concludes 
that market-based reordering of patent ownership, although not with-
out negatives, may promote efficient commercialization and blunt the 
need for government intervention in certain alternative energies. It 
should be factored into any rational public energy policy. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 In recent years, the global community has expressed increasing 
concern regarding the availability of future energy supplies. If oil 
production peaks in the near future, as some suggest,1 subsequent 
supply will fail to meet demand. The emergence of China and India 
as major consumers places even greater constraints on energy mar-
kets.2 To be sure, the current economic downturn has temporarily re-
lieved some of the pressure,3 but energy-producing states have been 
laboring to support prices,4 and the failure to pursue expanded pro-
duction may lead to a severe shortage when the economy recovers.5
In addition to supply issues, current energy sources produce signifi-
cant levels of greenhouse gases that are now widely believed to be 
contributing to a global warming trend.6 Moreover, many energy re-
                                                                                                                    
 1. The notion of peak oil was discussed extensively in a 2005 report sponsored by the 
U.S. Department of Energy. ROBERT L. HIRSCH ET AL., PEAKING OF WORLD OIL
PRODUCTION: IMPACTS, MITIGATION, & RISK MANAGEMENT (2005). Predictions of when it 
will occur differ significantly. Id. at 17-19. U.S. oil production peaked some time ago in the 
early 1970s. Id. at 16. 
 2. Id. at 55. See generally INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA), WORLD ENERGY 
OUTLOOK 2007: CHINA AND INDIA INSIGHTS (2007). 
 3. See IEA, OIL MARKET REPORT 4 (2009) [hereinafter IEA-OMR] (forecasting that as 
a result of the economic crisis and conservation in response to high prices in the summer of 
2008, world oil use will fall for the first time since the early 1980s).
 4. See Brian Baskin, Oil Ends at $45.38, a Five-Week High, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 
2009, at C12 (“The draw indicates that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
has met with some success in reducing production to match demand weakened by the glob-
al economic downturn.”); Spencer Swartz & Neil King, Jr., OPEC Cuts 1.5 Million Barrels 
from Daily Output; Cartel’s Move to Slash 2% of World Demand Lacks Immediate Impact; 
Oil Price Drops to Lowest Level Since May 2007, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2008, at A6 (describ-
ing the oil producing cartel’s attempt to shore up prices in the midst of economic decline). 
 5. According to the IEA, curbed investment and inadequate new supply in the face of 
a global recovery “could sow the seed of a sudden reversion to much higher prices, and fur-
ther intense price volatility, . . . with all the adverse impacts on economic growth that this 
would imply.” IEA-OMR, supra note 3, at 24. 
 6. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 36-41 (2007). 
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sources, particularly oil, are in the hands of unstable governments 
that appear to pose an ever greater threat to international security 
as their pockets are lined with energy profits.7 Though people may 
reasonably disagree as to the level of danger posed by any one of 
these issues, it is fair to say that a cumulative pressure has pushed 
the global consciousness toward the investigation of alternative  
fuel sources. 
 At a glance, biofuels appear to neatly address many of the prob-
lems in current energy supplies. They are a source of energy that can 
be produced in large quantities by any country with advanced agri-
cultural technologies and resources,8 may be more environmentally 
friendly than fossil fuels,9 and could serve as a rural development 
tool to boot.10 However, in its current form, biofuel production has 
produced significant externalities, causing policymakers to look to-
ward the high-tech future of so-called second generation or cellulosic 
biofuels.11 In this emerging environment, intellectual property—
particularly patents—can be expected to play a significant role. If in-
tellectual property rights provide the expected research and devel-
opment incentives, the future of biofuel innovation and global energy 
supplies should be bright. 
 Unfortunately, there is a cloud on the horizon. In developing in-
dustries where dominant players have yet to emerge, overlapping pa-
tents may be spread among many competitors, forming a thicket of 
rights. Second generation biofuels could comport with this model. 
Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg pointed out several years ago 
that such an overabundance of rights could act as an anticommons—
a state in which no one can commercialize due to the veto power of 
                                                                                                                    
 7. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NATIONAL SECURITY CONSEQUENCES OF U.S.
OIL DEPENDENCY 22-23 (2006). 
 8. Stephan Herrera, Bonkers About Biofuels, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 755,  
755 (2006). 
 9. IEA, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2006, at 391-93 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 ENERGY 
OUTLOOK] (discussing the possible positive environmental impact of biofuels but noting 
that several factors may change this). 
 10. See, e.g., STEVEN E. SEXTON & DAVID ZILBERMAN, BIOFUEL IMPACTS ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, THE ENVIRONMENT AND FOOD 17-18 (2008), available at
http://www.energybiosciencesinstitute.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_down
load&gid=13; Ofir D. Rubin et al., Implied Objectives of U.S. Biofuels Subsidies 10-17 (Ctr. 
for Agric. and Rural Dev. at Iowa State Univ., Working Paper 08-WP 459, 2008), available 
at http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/DBS/PDFFiles/08wp459.pdf (discussing the 
impact of biofuels on job creation and commodity prices). A viable, long-term industry can 
funnel profits into small businesses (as well as large agribusinesses). The recent rise in 
commodity prices has seen the revival of small towns across the Midwest. See Jason Beau-
bien, Morning Edition: Ethanol Demand, Prices Boost Farm Communities (transcript of 
NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 4, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/ 
story/story.php?storyId=87782087. 
 11. See, e.g., Mark Svenvold, The Biofuel Race, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 9, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/09/magazine/09_7_biofuel.html. 
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any individual’s overlapping patent.12 Theoretically, an anticommons 
can slow or completely stall innovation. If this occurs, the hope 
placed on biofuel energy may be effectively dashed. 
 This Article considers the issue of patent barriers in alternative 
energy research and provides new optimism by highlighting an often-
overlooked countering effect: private ordering. The ability of firms in 
some technologies to consolidate patent rights through sales and li-
censing can significantly reduce holdups, preserving the pace of in-
novation. To explore the private ordering phenomenon, this Article 
first provides context in Part II by articulating the connection be-
tween patents and emerging technologies. The problem of building 
block patents as well as patent thickets is addressed. Next, in Part 
III, the Article describes the effect of private ordering, drawing an 
analogy to agricultural biotechnology. Positive mechanisms of private 
ordering behaviors are provided and the necessary conditions for or-
dering are described. Finally, in Part IV, the Article provides an out-
line for integrating the reality of private ordering into energy policy. 
It suggests tools for avoiding market failures with information rather 
than regulation, but it also cautions as to the broader social implica-
tions of consolidation, which may be quite negative. The road to 
energy security is littered with ill-considered policy choices, the Ar-
ticle concludes, but the situation is now much more critical. Failing 
to consider the behavior of the private market would be a serious 
misstep in the search for a solution so desperately needed. 
II.   PATENT CHAOS AND ENERGY INNOVATION
 The recent emphasis on alternative energy sources has brought 
biofuels like ethanol to the forefront of the debate. Despite their ra-
ther low-tech heritage, future biofuel sources are grounded in cut-
ting-edge research. The positive impact of private patent rights on 
innovation in research-intensive fields is an essential presumption of 
the intellectual property system. But the reality is that patent rights 
can serve as innovation barriers in some instances. Nascent fields 
like second-generation biofuels may be especially susceptible. In view 
of these concerns, it would be logical to conclude that government in-
tervention is necessary to preserve optimal levels of invention  
and commercialization. 
A.   From the Farm to the Lab: Biofuel’s Future in High Technology 
 Biofuel is often discussed as a future, exotic fuel source in the 
United States, but it has actually been in wide use for many years 
                                                                                                                    
 12. Michael Heller & Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anti-
commons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-99 (1998). 
2009]                          PRIVATE ORDERING 419 
and is the leading source of renewable energy.13 In fact, the United 
States is a world leader in biofuel production.14 The most basic and 
commonly used biofuel is ethanol.15 Ethanol is derived primarily from 
farmed feedstocks (as opposed to lab-grown cell cultures) and can 
power just about any type of mechanical device, provide heat, and 
supply electricity. Interestingly, the technology for producing large 
quantities of ethanol from feedstocks like corn and sugar cane16 is not 
dramatically different from the methods that have been used for 
thousands of years to produce alcoholic beverages.17 It is generally 
viewed in the short term as a replacement for fossil-based automobile 
fuels like gasoline and diesel,18 but it may have additional long-term 
uses. Another common biofuel is “biodiesel,” a high-energy oil prod-
uct that can be derived from biomass waste products or even used 
food oil.19 Because it requires a significant conversion of existing au-
tomobile engine technology for use in gasoline-powered engines, it 
has not received as much attention and constitutes only about ten 
percent of the world’s biofuel production.20
 However, existing biofuel technology has important limitations 
that make it far less viable as future fuel source, at least in its 
present form. One limitation is the amount of greenhouse gasses re-
leased by the production of bioethanol from corn. When the fuel for 
farm machinery and electricity for production facilities (both of which 
                                                                                                                    
 13. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), biomass consti-
tuted fifty-three percent of the energy consumption from renewable sources, edging out 
hydroelectric at thirty-six percent. EIA, RENEWABLE ENERGY TRENDS IN CONSUMPTION 
AND ELECTRICITY 2007, at 1 (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/ 
solar.renewables/page/trends/trends.pdf. 
 14. 2006 ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 9, at 387 (noting that the United States was 
predicted to overtake Brazil in biofuel production by 2006). 
 15. Daniel M. Kammen et al., Energy and Greenhouse Impacts of Biofuels: A Frame-
work for Analysis, in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
(OECD), BIOFUELS—LINKING SUPPORT TO PERFORMANCE 41, 45 (2008). 
 16. Practically any sugar or starch containing biomass can be readily employed to 
make ethanol, and different countries rely on a variety of different crops. For example, 
Brazil has for years employed a wildly successful program to convert sugar cane into etha-
nol. 2006 ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 9, at 387. The country even exports surplus etha-
nol derived from this high-energy source. Id. at 397. 
 17. After the biomass is collected, it is fermented until the sugar converts to ethanol. 
Id. at 388. That ethanol is then distilled to a more pure form. Id. While the machinery has 
certainly moved into the industrial age—with gigantic bioreactors and fermentors that can 
produce millions of gallons in a single batch—the technology has more in common with a 
medieval brewery than modern biotechnology techniques. See Richard Doornbosch & Ro-
nald Steenblik, Biofuels: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?, OECD Pub. No. 
SG/SD/RT(2007)3, at 10 (2007) (“Ethyl alcohol, or ethanol, can be produced from any feeds-
tock that contains relatively dense quantities of sugar or starchy crops, using nothing more 
than a flask.”); see also Kammen et al., supra note 15, at 46 (“[C]urrent biofuel production 
processes are many years old.”). 
 18. 2006 ENERGY OUTLOOK, supra note 9, at 386-87. 
 19. Id. at 387. 
 20. Id.
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are almost always derived from fossil sources) is taken into account, 
the advantage of biofuels compared to oil is less clear.21 Some argue 
that, depending on the processing and the particular biofuel feeds-
tock used, the total amount of greenhouse gasses produced actually 
represents a net increase over fossil fuels.22 This has obvious implica-
tions for the global warming rationale for switching to biofuels. Per-
haps a greater problem is posed by the current dependence on food-
related crops to produce bioethanol.23 For example, in the United 
States, corn is by far the most common source of bioethanol. Al-
though humans do not directly ingest the corn used for biofuel pro-
duction, it is used for farm animal feed.24 Additionally, it takes up a 
great deal of land that could otherwise be used for human food crops, 
with more land being converted to biofuel production each year.25
This dependence on food crops has led to the suggestion that biofuel 
production is increasing the price and scarcity of world food sources.26
In view of these issues, the wave of criticism against current biofuel 
sources has risen dramatically and quickly, dampening their pros-
pects for the future. 
 In response, biofuel proponents point to its high-technology fu-
ture, which could resolve a number of the current problems.27 These 
technologies are often termed “second generation” biofuels.28 Most 
plant matter, even in conventional biofuel feedstocks, is unsuitable 
                                                                                                                    
 21. Doornbosch & Steenblik, supra note 17, at 17-18 (describing greenhouse  
gas emissions). 
 22. Id. at 17 (“In some cases, emissions may be as high or higher than the net GHG 
emissions from gasoline vehicles.”); SEXTON & ZILBERMAN, supra note 10, at 9-10. 
 23. Doornbosch & Steenblik, supra note 17, at 33-34; John Carey et al., Food vs. Fuel,
BUS. WK., Feb. 5, 2007, at 80 (“The roughly 5 billion gallons of ethanol made in 2006 by 
112 U.S. plants consumed nearly one-fifth of the corn crop. If all the scores of factories un-
der construction or planned go into operation, fuel will gobble up no less than half of the 
entire corn harvest by 2008.”). 
 24. Doornbosch & Steenblik, supra note 17, at 33. 
 25. Id. at 33-34. 
 26. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS [OECD-FAO], AGRICULTURAL
OUTLOOK 2008-2017, at 17, 30 (2008) (“[T]he energy security, environmental, and economic 
benefits of biofuels production based on agricultural commodity feed stocks are at best 
modest, and sometimes even negative . . . .”); SEXTON & ZILBERMAN, supra note 10, at 14-
17. According to the USDA, biofuel production has contributed ten percent of the overall 
increase in food prices in the last year. Lauren Etter, Probe Sought of Bush Aides’ Biofuel 
Statistics, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2008, at A2. Some suggest that it may be significantly 
more when the impact on crops other than corn is taken into account. See Andrew Martin, 
The Man Who Dared to Question Ethanol, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2008, at BU.5, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/13/business/13feed.html (discussing the research of for-
mer USDA economist Keith Collins). 
 27. Doornbosch & Steenblik, supra note 17, at 5. But see Elisabeth Rosenthal, New 
Trend in Biofuels Has New Risks, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2008, at A6 (stating that some 
scientists are warning that second generation biofuels may pose problems because the 
feedstocks are often invasive species). 
 28. See, e.g., Doornbosch & Steenblik, supra note 17, at 5. 
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for current bioethanol production methods because it consists pri-
marily of woody “cellulose” as opposed to sugar or starch.29 However, 
it is possible to convert cellulose to either sugar or starch using en-
zymes or other biotechnology mechanisms.30 Such conversion opens 
up an almost limitless supply of biofuel feedstocks from sources that 
have no relation to the food supply. For example, switchgrass, jatro-
pha, and poplar are prominently mentioned cellulosic feedstocks.31
Cellulosic waste products from food crops, such as corn stover,32 could 
also be converted to ethanol. In addition to a greater variety of bio-
fuel sources, cellulosic feedstocks can be grown on land that is not 
important for food production.33 For many, including former Presi-
dent George W. Bush34 and President Barak Obama, the call is clear 
to “generate more cellulosic ethanol from agricultural products like 
corn stocks, switch grass and other crops our farmers grow.”35
 In spite of its clear advantages, cellulosic ethanol is not commer-
cially viable at this time. The expense of converting cellulose to 
starch or sugar exceeds the energy benefits.36 Therefore, there is an 
intense research effort into improving second-generation biofuels. It 
is generally perceived that a “breakthrough” is required to make cel-
lulosic ethanol a viable option in the future. This breakthrough will 
likely occur in one of three areas: (1) improved feedstocks, which may 
include genetically modified plants that provide greater energy 
stores or resist attack by insect or herbicide; (2) more effective or less 
expensive enzymes for breaking down cellulose into compounds that 
can be converted to ethanol; and (3) improved “ethanologens,” which 
are microorganisms that convert substrates into ethanol or other 
                                                                                                                    
 29. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (IEA), ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES 2006, at 277 
(2006) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES 2006]. 
 30. Id. at 277-79; EIA, Biofuels in the U.S. Transportation Sector (Feb. 2007), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/biomass.html [hereinafter EIA, Biofuels].
 31. See Doornbosch & Steenblik, supra note 17, at 11; PERSPECTIVES 2006, supra note 
29, at 278 (“Fast-growing crops rich in cellulosic components, such as poplar trees and 
switchgrass, are well suited to produce ethanol.”). 
 32. PERSPECTIVES 2006, supra note 29, at 277. 
 33. Doornbosch & Steenblik, supra note 17, at 14. 
 34. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush 
Participates in Panel on Cellulosic Ethanol (Feb. 22, 2007), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070222-5.html. 
 35. Barack Obama, Remarks at the Governor’s Ethanol Coalition, Energy Security Is 
National Security (Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://www.barackobama.com/2006/02/ 
28/energy_security_is_national_se.php; see also President Barack Obama Holds a News 
Conference with Regional Reporters, POL. TRANSCRIPT WIRE, Mar. 13, 2009 (“I’ve also said . 
. . that we’ve got to do a much better job of developing cellulosic ethanol, that corn-based 
ethanol, over time, is not going to provide us with the energy-efficient solutions that  
are needed.”). 
 36. Doornbosch & Steenblik, supra note 17, at 11; PERSPECTIVES 2006, supra note 29, 
at 278-79 (“Significant technological challenges exist for the production of ethanol from 
woody feedstocks because all the steps of the production process need to be optimized.”). 
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fuel-related compounds.37 Research may even bridge these categories, 
for example, by breeding enzymes into the plants themselves. 
 The leap forward that is necessary to commercialize cellulosic 
ethanol will require a great investment of time and money in basic 
research and development. Any company that makes such an in-
vestment will require some protection of its position to assure a re-
turn on its investment. This has been traditionally viewed as the role 
of intellectual property and, in particular, patent rights. For this rea-
son, the intellectual property environment for biofuels may be one of 
the most important factors in the emergence of economical and effi-
cient cellulosic sources. 
B.   Patents as a Critical Research Incentive 
 For many with dreams of profiting from a research breakthrough, 
patents are viewed as the ultimate tool. They provide their owners 
with the right to exclude others from most practical applications of 
the claimed invention.38 Although patents exist for a relatively short 
period, particularly when the time to develop and market an inven-
tion is taken off the top,39 they may give a patentee control over key 
technology at a critical stage, generating great rewards. Conversely, 
without patent protection, an inventor is left to rely on secrecy to 
prevent competitors from benefiting from his or her research and de-
velopment efforts.40 Public use without any protection may lead to 
free riding,41 which actually puts the inventor at a disadvantage vis-
à-vis a competitor. 
                                                                                                                    
 37. PERSPECTIVES 2006, supra note 29, at 278; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, BIOENERGY
RESEARCH CENTERS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE SCIENCE 9 (2008), available at
http://genomicsgtl.energy.gov/centers/brcbrochure_hq.pdf. 
 38. The U.S. Patent Act gives patent owners the right to exclude others from making, 
using, selling, or offering to sell the invention in this country, and it gives them the right to 
exclude others from importing it from another country without the authority of the patent 
owner. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(a), 271(e)(4)(B) (2000). 
 39. See, e.g., Daniel. R. Cahoy, An Incrementalist Approach to Patent Reform Policy, 9 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 587, 618 (2006) (indicating that although a patent term runs 
twenty years from the filing date, “[t]he effective patent life is shorter, as time spent prose-
cuting the application before the relevant patent examining authority comes off the top of 
the twenty-year term, leaving most patentees with approximately eighteen years”). 
 40. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294-95 (2003) (arguing that inventors will choose to keep 
inventions secret if the disclosures accompanying patent protection result in more losses 
than the exclusivity will provide in gains). 
 41. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual 
Property Protection of Software, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 333 (1995) (“The fundamental jus-
tification for creating property rights in the results of innovation is to deal with the appro-
priability problem.”); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializ-
ing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 717-18 (2001) (discussing Demsetz’s description of 
property rights as a solution to problem of underproduction when the inputs cannot other-
wise be fully appropriated). But for a detailed criticism of the potential overuse of the con-
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 It is asserted that the amount of patenting actually serves as a 
barometer of research activity.42 Observing the changes in the patent 
landscape over time yields a trove of information about who is in-
venting what and, perhaps more importantly, who is in the position 
to control the most essential technology. Of course, many other dy-
namics affect research and development spending, and it has been 
suggested that the impact of patents differs significantly by indus-
try.43 For example, because product life span is short in computer-
related technologies, the utility of patents is perceived to be very 
small, and companies generally do not innovate in order to obtain pa-
tents.44 On the other hand, other industries clearly engage in re-
search with a view toward obtaining patents. Biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals tend to be at the top of this group, and advocates for 
each vehemently argue that their success would be all but impossible 
without strong patent rights.45
 In predicting the impact of patent rights on next-generation bio-
fuel technologies, it is reasonable to place them in the same category 
as biotechnology. The anticipated advances are biologic in nature, 
and the agricultural industry has a robust history of utilizing bio-
technology research to increase crop yields, reduce insect infestation, 
and resist herbicides.46 This field of “agricultural biotechnology” has 
                                                                                                                    
cept of free riding in justifying intellectual property law, see Mark A. Lemley, Property, In-
tellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1046-50 (2005). 
 42. See, e.g., Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey, 28 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 1661, 1701-02 (1990) (“In spite of all the difficulties, patents statistics 
remain a unique resource for the analysis of the process of technical change.”); Jean O. 
Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Patent Quality and Research Productivity: Measuring In-
novation with Multiple Indicators, 114 ECON. J. 441, 441-43 (2004). 
 43. See Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI.
173, 174-75, 175 tbl.1 (1986) (surveying dependency on patents in 100 firms in twelve dis-
tinct industries). 
 44. See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revi-
sited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 
RAND J. ECON. 101, 102 (2001). 
 45. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 3, at 17-20 (2003) [hereinafter FTC, TO
PROMOTE INNOVATION], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (not-
ing the almost universal recognition of importance of patents in biotechnology industry—
“[p]articipants stated that the biotechnology industry would not have emerged ‘but for the 
existence of predictable patents’ ”); Ashish Arora et al., R&D and the Patent Premium 35 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9431, 2003), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9431.pdf. 
 46. See JORGE FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO & WILLIAM D. MCBRIDE, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
ADOPTION OF BIOENGINEERED CROPS 4-7 (2002) (detailing the extent of adoption of bioen-
gineered herbicide-tolerant and insect-resistant crops in the U.S.); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
ECON. RESEARCH SERV. (USDA-ERS), ECONOMIC ISSUES IN AGRICULTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 3, 10-11 (2001) [hereinafter ECONOMIC ISSUES IN AGRICULTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY] (providing an overview of several important genetic modifications to 
crops). See generally DANIEL CHARLES, LORDS OF THE HARVEST (2001) (describing the ra-
tionale for and implications of the increased use of biotechnology in agriculture).
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become extremely important;47 it is considered a distinct form of bio-
technology and has largely taken the place of plant breeding and 
chemical design in the research programs of large agribusinesses.48
As with biotechnology, the effort to create patentable advancements 
is quite resource-intensive. An agribusiness firm’s investment in re-
search and development must employ a very forward-looking pers-
pective on its ability to profit from the market, which creates a natu-
ral dependence on patent rights, among other mechanisms,49 to pro-
vide for a return on investment. 
 Interestingly, there is already evidence of increased patenting in 
biofuels as the energy resource has received more attention from 
government and industry. Looking simply at patents related to etha-
nol production from cellulosic biomass, one can see that patent appli-
cations have risen significantly in recent years (Figure 1). 
                                                                                                                    
 47. ECONOMIC ISSUES IN AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 46, at 1-2. 
 48. Id. For an excellent account of the struggle for the preeminence of biotechnology 
in the agricultural industry, see CHARLES, supra note 46, at 117-18. 
 49. An alternative to legal protection is a biological barrier to unauthorized use and 
propagation. For example, the much discussed genetic use restriction technology (GURT), 
also known as “terminator technology,” serves this function. See Richard Caplan, The On-
going Debate over Terminator Technology, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 751, 770-72 (2007); 
Sergio H. Lence & Dermot J. Hayes, Technology Fees Versus GURTs in the Presence of 
Spillovers: World Welfare Impacts, 8 AGBIOFORUM 172, 173 (2005). 
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FIGURE 1: PATENTS RELATED TO ETHANOL PRODUCED FROM CELLULOSIC 
FEEDSTOCKS50
 Biofuel innovators51 have clearly responded to the interest in al-
ternate fuels with increased research and development efforts52
(though the backlash against biofuels may induce a leveling off at 
some point in the near future). 
C.   The More Complex Reality of Patents as a Potential  
Innovation Barrier 
 The above discussion may lead one to conclude that stronger pa-
tent rights automatically lead to more innovation and that greater 
                                                                                                                    
 50. To obtain a broad view of the patents related to cellulosic ethanol production, the 
authors accessed the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) issued patents 
database (http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm) and used a search string 
designed to identify all patents containing relevant terms that resided in plant and micro-
organism classes: “(ccl/800/$ or ccl/435/$) and ethanol and (lignocellulos$ or cellulos$) and 
(fuel or fuels).” All the patents in the resulting group were individually reviewed to deter-
mine actual relevance, and unrelated patents were discarded. In addition, the authors 
compared the search results with an independent survey of the biofuel patent environment 
appearing in each issue of the publication Biofuels, Bioproducts and Biorefining to ensure 
that the essential patents were captured. See, e.g., Mara Staffilani et al., Patent Intelli-
gence, 2 BIOFUELS, BIOPRODUCTS & BIOREFINING 358, 359-72 (2008). However, the authors 
readily acknowledge that the search results may not be a perfect representation of biofuel 
patenting, as any search likely results in both type I errors (nonbiofuel patents included) 
and type II errors (biofuel patents excluded). 
 51. Such innovators include recent startups, such as Xethanol, see Global Energy 
Holdings Group, http://xethanol.com (last visited June 1, 2009), and large agribusinesses, 
such as Monsanto, see Press Release, Monsanto, Monsanto Company and Mendel Biotech-
nology Announce Cellulosic Biofuels Collaboration (Apr. 28, 2008), 
http://monsanto.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=596. 
 52. Patents in the study group were collected through December 2008.
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numbers of patents indicate more progress and a greater likelihood 
of breakthrough innovation in the market. Under these assumptions, 
one could reasonably conclude that the increasing number of biofuel-
related patents is evidence of a robust innovation environment. In-
ventions and patents, however, do not exist in discrete silos of devel-
opment and profit, with competitors having only parallel interests. 
There is often conflict. Patent rights can interact with the innovative 
efforts of others and actually limit the development of new products 
and services—or at least add to their expense. Some believe that the 
barriers can be so high as to require intervention in order to achieve 
a sufficient level of commercialization of important technologies.53
 The conflict in innovation environments is due to the intangible 
nature of intellectual property. Unlike, for example, real property 
rights, which are linked to a discrete piece of land or fixture upon 
that land, intellectual property rights are not associated with a par-
ticular object. Patents cover ideas that may not even be captured in a 
physical embodiment.54 This means that a broad technology field can 
be impacted in two dimensions. First, patent rights can be so expan-
sive or “foundational” as to cover entire categories of goods or servic-
es, regardless of whether the owner actually produces them.55
Second, it is possible for different rights to impact several aspects of 
a single technological embodiment, forming a thicket that one must 
traverse to market without infringing. Under certain market condi-
tions, patent owners may take advantage of such environments to 
hold up the efficient development of future innovations. 
1.   Initial Presence of Patent Control over Fundamental 
Technologies 
 A building block or foundational patent can be defined as one with 
claims covering a basic aspect of the technology.56 It is fundamental 
                                                                                                                    
 53. Michael Heller, who in 1998 joined Rebecca Eisenberg in describing the “anti-
commons,” see Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 12, has recently authored a book that pro-
poses such policy revision. See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO 
MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008). 
 54. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (“The primary meaning of the 
word ‘invention’ in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor’s conception rather 
than to a physical embodiment of that idea. The statute does not contain any express re-
quirement that an invention must be reduced to practice before it can be patented.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property 
Puzzle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1751 (2007). Some might also call these “pioneering” inven-
tions, and it has been argued that they should be accorded much power in order to encour-
age innovation. See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 439, 440-41 (2004) (discussing Edmund Kitch’s prospect theory, which would provide 
substantial power for early-stage innovation, and noting that it has become “a standard 
part of the law-and-economics literature on patent law”). 
 56. See, e.g., Kumar & Rai, supra note 55, at 1751 (2007) (characterizing foundational 
patents as those “with broad claims that appeared important to a large percentage of work 
in the area”). 
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to the way any specific embodiment will function. Foundational pa-
tents need not cover the entirety of important products or services, 
and they may have been filed long before such embodiments were 
envisioned. In fact, it is most likely that such patents will cover only 
a part or aspect of popular products. They may even cover enabling 
technology that relates to the manufacture or testing of a product but 
is not embodied in the product itself.57 Actual participants in the 
market may not even own them. What is essential is that an entire 
class of products or services cannot be produced without using the 
patent and no work-around is readily available. It is essentially im-
possible to participate in the field without treading on the patent 
owner’s rights.58 In such cases, the patentee has the power to prevent 
marketing of the covered products absent authorization. 
 There are essentially two ways a patent can attain fundamental 
status. One is that it covers a technology that is so groundbreaking 
and useful that industry widely accepts it as the base for future in-
novation.59 By definition, there is no alternative that will produce the 
same result. A second is that government or industry groups agree to 
adopt the covered technology as a standard.60 In this case, there may 
be viable alternatives, but adherence to the standard precludes them. 
Such determinations can be enhanced by network economics, switch-
ing costs, or inertia that confer great power on a broad patent cover-
ing the standard.61
                                                                                                                    
 57. Christopher M. Holman, Biotechnology’s Prescription for Patent Reform, 5 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 318, 333-34 (2006) (describing the patenting of funda-
mental enabling technologies in biotechnology, such as the synthesis of artificial  
antibody molecules). 
 58. See Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39, 
93 (2008) (describing such patents as part of the “intellectual infrastructure” and arguing 
that “[a]bsent efficient licensing . . . exclusive rights on this infrastructure may inhibit my-
riad downstream applications”). 
 59. Mark A. Lemley identifies several of these “building blocks” in fields such as bio-
technology, computers, chemistry, and television. Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnol-
ogy, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 606-14 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology].
 60. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 35.1a (2002 & Supp. 2008); Mark 
A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not to), 48 B.C. 
L. REV. 149, 154-55 (2007) [hereinafter Lemley, Ten Things] (describing how irreversible 
commitments to standards elevate the power a patent owner has to extract royalties); Phi-
lip B. Nelson, Patent Pools: An Economic Assessment of Current Law and Policy, 38 
RUTGERS L.J. 539, 544-45 (2007) (“The establishment of industry standards, which often 
takes years to complete, can give market power to individual patents that was not present 
before the standard-setting process began.”); see also Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, 
Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 523 (1998) (“To the 
extent intellectual property rights confer ownership interests in a strong network stan-
dard, they may create durable market power in network markets.”). 
 61. See Alan Devlin, A Neo-Chicago Perspective on the Law of Product Tying, 44 AM.
BUS. L.J. 521, 563 (2007) (“A second major feature of modern network industries is that 
consumers may face significant switching costs in attempting to move from an incumbent 
firm to a competitor.”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated 
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 In the biotechnology field, perhaps the best example of a funda-
mental technology patent is the one issued for Cohen and Boyer’s 
gene cloning technology.62 Another good candidate is the patent cov-
ering the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) process.63 Both concepts 
are essential to modern biotechnology research, and it is hard to im-
agine any biotech company or academic lab that does not make use of 
both. In agricultural biotechnology, one can look to the patents on 
transformation by Agrobacterium—a mechanism for transporting 
and incorporating genetic material into a plant cell—as a significant 
foundational technology that reflects a voluntary industry acknowl-
edgment of supremacy.64 Another example is Monsanto’s patent on 
Roundup® and genetically modified Roundup-Ready® seeds.65
 At this stage, it is difficult to determine what technologies will be 
the building blocks of second-generation biofuels. However, given the 
hope for a breakthrough in efficient cellulosic conversion, it is not 
unreasonable to imagine that such patents will issue. Additionally, 
existing technology that is applicable to general agriculture could be 
just as important to biofuel production. For example, technology for 
genetically modifying crops or herbicide and insect resistance may 
play a key role regardless of the specific gene enhancement. To the 
extent that one form of this technology proves essential in biofuel 
production, it will be, for all intents and purposes, foundational. 
 Interestingly, the breadth of a fundamental technology patent can 
also be an important weakness if it is the result of overclaiming. If a 
patent is determined to be overbroad in its claims, it can be deemed 
                                                                                                                    
Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1476-81 (2002) (modeling switching 
costs from a patented good in the context of brand loyalty); Jonathan L. Rubin, Patents, 
Antitrust, and Rivalry in Standard-Setting, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 509, 510 n.3 (2007) (“Howev-
er, given that consensus itself is usually extremely costly—standards often take years to 
develop—switching costs are almost always present, even if very large investments in im-
plementation have yet to be made.”). 
 62. Process for Producing Biologically Functional Molecular Chimeras, U.S. Patent 
No. 4,237,224 (filed Jan. 4, 1979) (issued Dec. 2, 1980); see also NAT’L RES. COUNCIL,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE DISSEMINATION OF RESEARCH TOOLS IN 
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 40-42 (1997); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform 
and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 300 (2003). 
 63. Process for Amplifying Nucleic Acid Sequences, U.S. Patent No. 4,683,202 (filed 
Oct. 25, 1985) (issued July 28, 1987). Mark A. Lemley notes that this patent was widely 
and successfully licensed but ultimately declared unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. 
Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, supra note 59, at 611. 
 64. See, e.g., Holman, supra note 57, at 335-36 (describing the significance of the pa-
tents to the agricultural biotechnology industry). The ownership of the patented technology 
was actually a matter of significant legal dispute between four entities—Bayer Crop 
Science, Max Planck Society, Garching Innovation, and Monsanto—that was apparently 
resolved only recently. Id.; Press Release, Monsanto Co., Bayer Cropscience, Max Planck 
Society, Monsanto Company Resolve Agrobacterium Patent Dispute (Feb. 4, 2005), 
http://www.monsanto.co.uk/news/ukshowlib.phtml?uid=8561. 
 65. Chimeric Genes for Transforming Plant Cells Using Viral Promoters, U.S. Patent 
No. 5,352,605 (filed Oct. 28, 1993) (issued Oct. 4, 1994). 
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invalid and essentially disappear.66 There is an inherent risk in ag-
gressively enforcing such patents. In many cases, a preferable strat-
egy is to tread lightly and license broadly, leaving the right untested 
in a formal legal proceeding.67 Several foundational patents in bio-
technology have followed this pattern.68 This creates a de facto limi-
tation on the power of foundational patents. 
 Another important limitation on fundamental technology patent 
control is the passage of time. Due to the strict conditions of patenta-
bility, such applications generally end up being filed early in the li-
fespan of the technology.69 Any attempt to cover a greater breadth of 
invention following the disclosure of a narrower embodiment would 
commonly be rejected as anticipated or obvious.70 And while it is 
possible for one to file a patent on foundational technology early but 
wait to bring it to issuance until after the valuable applications be-
come clear, the impact of such efforts will be limited since a patent 
term is calculated from the filing date.71 Moreover, one cannot simply 
extend the power of a broad patent by filing subsequent, related pa-
tents based on the original disclosure because the original claimed 
invention will be available to competitors once the initial right ex-
pires.72 The result is that foundational patents usually cannot domi-
                                                                                                                    
 66. The three controls on the problem of overclaiming are the requirements that pa-
tent claims be nonobvious and enabled and that the patentee provide a written description 
of the invention sufficient to demonstrate that it was fully conceived. See Cahoy, supra
note 39, at 614-15. 
 67. This is allegedly the strategy employed by the famed Jerome Lemelson, who in-
duced some of the country’s largest companies to settle cases related to his questionable 
bar code patents rather than pursue cases in court. See Susan Hansen, Breaking the (Bar) 
Code, IP L. & BUS., Mar. 2004. 
 68. See Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, supra note 59, at 610-11 (describing wide-
spread licensing of foundational biotechnology patents). But see Kumar & Rai, supra note 
55, at 1754 (suggesting that the historical pattern of broad licensing in biotechnology may 
not occur in current technological contexts). 
 69. Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes—A Proposed Re-Definition of “First-
to-Invent,” 49 ALA. L. REV. 755, 768-70 (1998) (explaining the requirement that a prospec-
tive patentee move forward with patenting diligently). The early disclosure incentive is 
even greater in countries that have a first-to-file system (which is most of the world). Id. at 
757 (“In fact, every nation in the world except the United States and the Philippines fol-
lows a first-to-file system.”). The patent rules also encourage a complete early disclosure, 
lest the doctrine of “prosecution history estoppel” narrow claims that were drafted too 
broadly or ambiguously. See R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administra-
tion and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 216-21 (2002). 
 70. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, supra note 59, at 610-11 (“[A] number of early 
Federal Circuit decisions gave biotechnology patents a narrow scope, making it impossible 
to patent a broad genus based even on pioneering work and leaving the development of 
that genus open to others.”). 
 71. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). The doctrine of prosecution laches may even serve as 
a barrier to delayed patenting within the twenty-year time period. See Symbol Techs., Inc. 
v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., 422 F.3d 1378, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 
amended in part on reh’g, 429 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 72. Some refer to the process of extending patent rights through subsequent filings as 
“evergreening.” See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy,
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nate a technology for very long. In industries with long research and 
development lead times, they may expire just as a technology ma-
tures, or even before. 
 Finally, to the extent that fundamental technology patents result 
from federal grants, the government possesses the ability to compel 
licensing on reasonable terms. Under the Bayh-Dole Act’s so-called 
“march-in” rights provision, the granting agency can compel the pa-
tent owner to license the invention if it is necessary, inter alia, to 
“achieve practical application of the subject invention” or “meet re-
quirements for public use.”73 To date, such provisions have not been 
used,74 but they remain viable and may serve as bargaining chips  
for policymakers. 
 Because foundational patents in biofuel technology are likely to 
experience the above limitations in a manner similar to general  
biotechnology,75 their impact could be blunted. Such patents could 
figure prominently in early start-up periods, but they may not 
present an appreciable barrier to commercialization as the technolo-
gy matures.76 Instead of breadth, the larger patent menace may be 
the infamous thicket. 
2.   Growing Thickets Through Diverse Ownership 
 The world of applied science is filled with examples of “hot” tech-
nologies that suddenly capture the attention of academia and indus-
try.77 The shared interest among several parties in a particular inno-
                                                                                                                    
13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 348-49 (2007). However, subsequent patents do 
not, in and of themselves, restrict the use of inventions in prior patents. Unless some sort 
of regulatory structure (such as FDA approval) extends the power of subsequent patents, 
evergreening is rarely a major obstacle to innovation.  
 73. 35 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2000). 
 74. See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 628 (2008) [hereinafter Lemley, Patent Trolls].
 75. See supra notes 27-37 for a description of biofuel technology, particularly second-
generation research, which is essentially biotechnology based. Scholars have suggested 
that biotechnology did not suffer greatly from foundational patent coverage in part because 
the inventors were primarily located at universities, which “had strong norms against pa-
tenting, particularly in medical inventions.” Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, supra note 
59, at 609-10. Thus, the lack of intellectual property holdup was a result of unusual condi-
tions that will not repeat themselves, particularly in view of the greater emphasis on pa-
tenting by universities. See Lemley, Patent Trolls, supra note 74, at 614-19 (discussing the 
rise in university patenting and the increased likelihood that they will engage in technolo-
gy holdups). 
 76. See Duffy, supra note 55, at 464-75 (suggesting that early, broad patents channel 
competition that pushes back the filing dates, resulting in early dedication to the public, 
and presenting a model to demonstrate the concept). 
 77. For an economic explanation of this behavior, see James H. Cardon & Dan Sasaki, 
Preemptive Search and R&D Clustering, 29 RAND J. ECON 324 (1998). Historical exam-
ples in agricultural biotechnology include the race for genetically controlled herbicide re-
sistance. See CHARLES, supra note 46, at 60-73; see also Samson Vermont, Independent In-
vention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475, 478-79 (2006); Malcolm 
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vation results in multiple research and development programs. Pa-
tents will typically result from such programs, even if the immediate 
practical applications are unclear. The property space can quickly 
become populated by a diverse collection of rights.78 These rights may 
overlap or cover different aspects of the same product or service. This 
is true even when there are patents that claim a commercial embo-
diment of a product (a genetically modified seed, for example), as the 
embodiment may still be subject to patents on enabling technology or 
some other inherent aspect (a fundamental plant cloning technology 
or a particular herbicide regimen necessary to produce the product, 
for example). Overlapping rights may form what has become widely 
known as a patent thicket, a state in which it is impossible to find a 
clear path to commercialization without intruding on another’s (or 
several others’) patent rights.79 Before a product or service can be 
marketed, all owners must assent, as any one owner has the power to 
hold up (or at least impose significant costs on)  
the technology.80
 Theoretically, if all property owners could be identified, bargain-
ing would always proceed to a rational end and the technology would 
be available at some price.81 However, it has been suggested that be-
havioral barriers to bargaining remain when one party perceives an 
outsized opportunity to hold up another’s valuable use. For example, 
Lemley and Shapiro assert that complementary patent owners will 
tend to demand excessive royalty rates that will make an invention 
                                                                                                                    
Gladwell, In the Air, NEW YORKER, May 12, 2008, at 50 (discussing the phenomenon of si-
multaneous invention when the pursuits of research programs are not necessarily public). 
 78. The rush to control a technology field of high interest through intellectual proper-
ty is termed a patent race by economists. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 40, at 300-01
(describing patent races); Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV.
115, 183-90 (2003) (describing the phenomenon and noting the three primary problems 
with races). 
 79. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 124-26 (Adam B. Jaffe 
et al. eds., 2001) (describing as a basis of patent thicket, the “holdup” problem “where hun-
dreds if not thousands of patents . . . can potentially read on [the same] product”). A prima-
ry reason for the overlap is that patent rights include no use rights, but only the right to 
exclude others; thus, ownership of a patent conveys no freedom to operate. See Christopher 
M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and Access: A Survey of 
Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295, 302 (2007). 
 80. Lemley, Patent Trolls, supra note 74, at 613-14 (discussing the rise of patent hol-
dups and, by extension, patent “trolls”). After the Supreme Court’s eBay decision, it is less 
likely that the owner of a patent on a minor aspect of an invention will be granted injunc-
tive rights. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 81. See F. Scott Kieff, On Coordinating Transactions in Intellectual Property: A Re-
sponse to Smith’s Delineating Entitlements in Information, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART
101, 108 (2007) (disputing the general notion that the number of patents in and of itself 
creates a hold-out problem and noting that “[p]atentees have a strong incentive to encour-
age use, not to block it”).  
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unmarketable.82 Heller points to research suggesting that there is an 
embedded tendency for such individualistic behavior.83 But a review 
of the most commonly discussed examples indicates that this beha-
vior is tied to a situation in which technology is already in production 
and cannot be abandoned; the manufacturer is over a proverbial bar-
rel. On the other hand, if the manufacturer has yet to invest in sub-
stantial development efforts and can simply walk away from the 
project, the holdout power is dramatically reduced.84 Thus, it makes 
sense to distinguish between ex ante patent negotiation, which oc-
curs prior to development, and ex post negotiation, which occurs af-
ter development, in presuming persistent holdout behavior. The ex 
ante negotiation context is the correct one for biofuels and should 
stimulate rational bargaining.
 Thus, the most troublesome quality of a thicket in nascent fields is 
the risk that one may not be able to conclusively determine all of the 
patents that read on a product or service. Relevant patents can pop 
up and catch even sophisticated manufacturers by surprise. Al-
though it is possible to search the U.S. Patent and Trademark Of-
fice’s database for inventions that appear facially similar, one might 
miss relevant patents due to subtle differences in language or an 
overly narrow conception of what constitutes an inventive aspect.85 In 
addition, relevant patents may come to issuance subsequent to a 
comprehensive search (though the surprise is somewhat reduced by 
the ability to search published applications).86
 Patent thickets have been theorized to act as a major obstacle to 
technology development in some fields. A single product may need to 
traverse so many overlapping rights that it requires hundreds, if not 
thousands, of licenses for production.87 The inevitability of failing to 
                                                                                                                    
 82. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 2003-04, 2010-11 (2007). 
 83. See HELLER, supra note 53, at 44 (citing the research of Sven Vanneste et al., 
From “Tragedy” to “Disaster”: Welfare Effects of Commons and Anticommons Dilemmas, 26
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 104 (2006), and Steven Stewart & David J. Bjornstad, An Experi-
mental Investigation of Predictions and Symmetries in the Tragedies of the Commons and 
Anticommons (Joint Inst. for Energy and Env’t, Report No. JIEE 2002-07, 2002)). 
 84. Lemley and Shapiro agree that this option reduces the holdup problem, but they 
assert that the likelihood of royalty overcharges persists unless the patent is “nothing spe-
cial” or so “ironclad” as to be unassailable in litigation. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 82, 
at 2003-04. Of course, the existence of royalty overcharging in this context does not mean 
that the invention will be abandoned.  
 85. Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property 
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1298-99 (2008) (“Because of the notorious difficulty in  
assessing the breadth and coverage of patent claims, patent searches can be difficult  
and expensive.”). 
 86. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000) (requiring publication of most U.S. patents after  
eighteen months). 
 87. See FTC, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 45, ch. 3, at 34-35 (2003); Lemley, 
Patent Trolls, supra note 74, at 613; Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent 
Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 55 (2007). 
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license at least one right supposedly leads to the rise of so-called pa-
tent “trolls”—patent owners who hold up technology for a toll without 
contributing anything to the progress of the useful arts.88 The addi-
tional licensing and transaction costs can lead to underutilization of 
resources under a theoretical construct known as the “tragedy of  
the anticommons.”89
 Significantly, thickets or anticommons do not appear to be equally 
problematic in all industries. For example, some suggest that com-
puter and software-related technologies—which, not coincidentally, 
are the industrial segments currently pushing for patent reform90—
have a much greater problem with thicket formation than pharma-
ceuticals and biotechnology.91 Developing fields may suffer more 
deeply from this pitfall. Before wide commercialization, diverse 
groups of inventors seeking to take advantage of an uncertain future 
market may exist.92 The lack of clear market leaders reduces the bar-
riers to possible adoption of new technology and makes the research 
and development risk worthwhile. 
 Are thickets or the anticommons likely to be a problem for biofu-
els? It should be acknowledged at the outset that these are elusive 
phenomena, and no one has devised a generally accepted method of 
identifying them; any predictions are necessarily somewhat specula-
tive. However, there is certainly the potential for thicket formation if 
one analogizes the similarity in biofuel industry structure to early 
stage biotechnology. And early empirical evidence supports the pos-
sibility of thicket formation. The ownership of relevant patents is 
quite diverse, at least with respect to other highly developed seg-
ments of agricultural biotechnology. For example, one can compare 
the biofuel patent environment to that for genetically modified, her-
                                                                                                                    
 88. Lemley, Patent Trolls, supra note 74, at 629. 
 89. See generally Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 12. Some scholars distinguish be-
tween thickets and the anticommons, while acknowledging that they are closely related. 
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1611-15 (2003). More recently, Mark A. Lemley suggested that the anticommons may not 
be as problematic as many believe because many companies simply “ignore patents” and 
innovate. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21-22 (2008). 
 90. See Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System, FED. LAW., Feb. 2008, at 44, 45. 
 91. Patent Reform Legislation – Public Comments on Substitute HR 2795 and the Role 
of the Antitrust Modernization Commission Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm.
(2005) (testimony of Mark A. Lemley), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/ 
commission_hearings/pdf/Statement_Lemley.pdf (“[P]harmaceutical patents are more like-
ly to cover a whole drug, rather than one of 5,000 different components of a semiconductor 
chip. So patent owners in the pharmaceutical industries don’t have to worry about and [sic] 
endless stream of patent owners asserting rights in their drugs.”). In his recent book, Hel-
ler makes the interesting assertion that pharmaceutical companies actually are troubled 
by the anticommons, but they essentially will not admit it because they are more con-
cerned about the effect that weaker patents would have on challenges from generic phar-
maceutical competitors. See HELLER, supra note 53, at 77. 
 92. See Lemley, Patent Trolls, supra note 74, at 614-19. 
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bicide-resistant plants (Table 1). The latter is a useful comparison 
group because the classification is specifically directed to a technolo-
gy that could be considered the epitome of agricultural biotechnology 
in the 1980s and 1990s.  







Number of  
Patents 525 1013 239 
Number of Discrete 
Patent Owners96 37 118 77 
Percent Ownership 
by Top 3 Firms 85.0% 69.6% 33.5% 
 Not only is the number of owners proportionally different in each 
segment, but the percentage of ownership is also dramatically lower 
                                                                                                                    
 93. Numbers derived from the USPTO patents database for 1988 through 2008. 
USPTO Patent Full-Text and Image Database, http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-
adv.htm (last visited June 1, 2009). Using classification 800, sub-classification 300.1 as a 
Boolean search term (Patents directed to Multicellular Living Organisms and Unmodified 
Parts Thereof and Related Processes: Herbicide resistant plant which is transgenic or mu-
tant, and the plant is maize), relevant patents were identified. The authors chose this da-
tabase, as well as the one noted in infra note 94, because its contents—patents directed to 
plants that have been genetically modified for herbicide resistance—are very specific to 
agricultural biotechnology and are unlikely to be contaminated with patents related to 
other industries. However, it is important to note that the consolidation of patent owner-
ship in corn and noncorn GM plant inventions may be the result of overall industry trends 
rather than a past thicket/anticommons problem in this particular class. 
 94. Patents identified using classification 800, sub-classification 300 as a Boolean 
search term (Patents directed to Multicellular Living Organisms and Unmodified Parts 
Thereof and Related Processes: Herbicide resistant plant which is transgenic or mutant). 
 95. Patents identified using the search described in supra note 50. 
 96. Ownership determined by utilizing the assignment information on the face of the 
patent and modifying where dictated by using the USPTO’s assignment records 
(http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat) and public information regarding cor-
porate consolidation. Patent ownership was consolidated as follows: 
Monsanto: Asgrow, Stine Seeds (shared), Delta Pine, Seminis, Calgene, 
Emergent Genetics, Agracetus, Dekalb, Holden’s Foundation, 
MGI Pharma, First Line. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred: DuPont, Hybrinova, Mertec, EvoGene, Bigemma. 
Bayer Crop Sci.: Aventis, Rhone Poulenc Rhorer, Hoescht, Schering, AgrEvo, 
Plant Genetic Systems. 
Syngenta: Novartis, Ciba-Geigy, Sandoz, Advanta, Garst, Northrup 
King, Mogen, Zeneca, J.C. Robinson, Golden Harvest. 
Dow: Cargil, Agrigentics, Mycogen, Illinois Foundation. 
Limagrain: Soygenetics, Harris Moran. 
BASF: American Cyanamid. 
Danisco: Genencor, Xyrofin. 
Verenium: Diversa, Celunol. 
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in biofuel technology.97 In the latter, no small group of firms  
is dominant.98
 One might reasonably believe that, without additional influences, 
the biofuel patent landscape will grow dense and populated by trolls. 
Significantly, innovation may be underincentivized due to the costs 
in traversing the dense patent space. However, there are private 
forces that may have a great ability to reshape ownership trends and 
realign innovation. Whether they are beneficial to public innovation 
goals depends on the manner in which they are carried out. 
III.   THE PARADIGM OF PRIVATE ORDERING 
 Private ordering is the concept of self-regulation and realign-
ment.99 The term often refers to interactions in the absence of law.100
However, a modern application is the private allocation of rights and 
duties against the background of public enforcement, with private 
contracting being a primary example of this form of mixed order-
ing.101 This Article applies the mixed ordering definition and con-
trasts it with government regulation and reallocation of assets.102
                                                                                                                    
 97. Note that, as a general rule, the percentage owned by the top three groups would 
be expected to be higher in the early stages of development, as only a few individuals or 
firms invest in invention. Thus, the contrast between biofuel and genetically modified 
plants is especially striking. 
 98. There is also evidence of a difference between biofuel technology and agricultural 
biotechnology in general. If one compares the biofuel ownership concentration to an ex-
tremely detailed U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service (USDA-ERS) 
calculation of agricultural biotechnology ownership patterns, one can see that the latter is 
clearly more concentrated. See USDA-ERS, Agricultural Biotechnology Intellectual Proper-
ty: Overview Chart 4, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/AgBiotechIP/Gallery/Graphic4.htm 
(last visited June 1, 2009) [hereinafter USDA-ERS Patent Consolidation] (demonstrating a 
concentration of nearly forty percent for the top ten firms). 
 99. Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 324-29 (2002)  
(noting that private ordering can be viewed on a spectrum with different levels of govern-
ment participation). 
 100. See, e.g., Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards 
a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2338 (2004) (stating that 
the literature of private ordering principally examines merchant communities that enforce 
agreements without state-sponsored courts). 
 101. See Jean Braucher, New Frontiers in Private Ordering—An Introduction, 49 ARIZ.
L. REV. 577, 577-78 (2007) (“Contract law itself is a mixture of the public and the private, a 
means by which the state supports private ordering with remedies for breach of some 
promises.”); see also F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, Engineering a Deal: Toward a Pri-
vate Ordering Solution to the Anticommons Problem, 48 B.C. L. REV. 111, 115 n.15 (2007) 
(stating, in the context of intellectual property transactions, that “we use ‘private ordering’ 
to refer to circumstances where parties, given extant legal and regulatory regimes, order 
the substance of their affairs and transactions as they see fit and resort to the judicial sys-
tem for enforcement”). 
 102. Although the ordering is private in the sense that firms continue to own the rights 
and decide when to deal, it is certainly possible for government to play a facilitating role. It 
can create incentives for ordering, for example, by rewarding efficiency and progress in 
technology development as endpoints, see, e.g., Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007 (EISA), Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 207, 121 Stat. 1492, 1531 (grants for production of ad-
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In this light, private ordering is a common aspect of the  
business environment. 
 The notion that private industry is inclined to collaborate to re-
solve patent barriers is not surprising. There is an obvious advantage 
to coordinating with other market participants to identify and ad-
dress intellectual property rights that might complicate the introduc-
tion of new technology, particularly if a major player does not own it. 
The difficult task is to do it in a way that does not risk antitrust ex-
posure. Whenever competitors collaborate, there is a danger that 
they may be entering into an agreement in restraint of trade.103 This 
risk is compounded when the agreement concerns a market exclusion 
device such as a patent. 
 Interestingly, it seems that some industries are more inclined to-
ward order. In determining whether second-generation biofuels con-
stitute such an industry, it is worth first considering the strong tra-
dition of collaboration in the sector that is most analogous: agricul-
tural biotechnology. The analysis is particularly significant because 
it is a field that is not plagued by patent trolls. From agricultural 
biotechnology’s history, one can identify several mechanisms that 
firms have used over the years to address intellectual property bar-
riers. In general, they have survived antitrust scrutiny and thus pro-
vide a roadmap for the future of the biofuel industry if it is to avoid 
the pitfalls of thickets and holdouts. 
                                                                                                                    
vanced biofuels), and by articulating legal structures that will not be challenged, see, e.g.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995) [hereinafter DOJ/FTC 1995 GUIDELINES], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/0558.pdf. Alternatively, government can discourage or-
dering by creating uncertainty in antitrust prosecution or failing to follow through on guid-
ing technology policy. In addition, regulation can play a major part in encouraging ordering 
by conferring market power on certain technology and eliminating the value in others. For 
example, genetically modified crops have permitted the technology to gain an important 
hold on certain types of food, but the extent of adoption is limited by regulation. WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. (WHO), FOOD SAFETY DEP’T, MODERN FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGY, HUMAN 
HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT: AN EVIDENCE-BASED STUDY 4-5 (2005) (describing the geneti-
cally modified food crops that have been approved for sale in some countries but not oth-
ers). But see Kieff & Paredes, supra note 101, at 145-46 (noting that ill-timed regulation 
can have a destabilizing effect on private ordering). This is something significantly less 
than central economic control, but it is an incursion on the pure market. One might argue 
that government action is best reserved unless there is evidence of a market failure. 
 103. However, in its 2000 guidelines on the matter, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) went out of their way to make clear that “[s]uch 
collaborations often are not only benign but procompetitive,” so it is important to under-
stand the legal limits. FED. TRADE COMM’N AND U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST 
GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 1 (2000) [hereinafter FTC/DOJ 
2000 GUIDELINES], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf. 
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A.   Agricultural Biotechnology as a Historical Analogy 
 A primary reason the history of agricultural biotechnology intel-
lectual property provides such a good model for what will occur in 
biofuels is that the connection to the basic science is the same.104 In 
addition, many of the same companies that were involved in the de-
velopment of early agricultural biotechnology are seeking a role in 
biofuels.105 It is a rich story of technological development that is both 
informative and intriguing. 
 The basic techniques in agricultural biotechnology were first de-
veloped in universities and government labs in the 1970s.106 Interest 
quickly spread to existing agricultural giants like Monsanto that had 
been dependent on chemical herbicides and fertilizers for tweaking 
crop yields.107 The large agricultural firms worked to integrate genet-
ically manipulated crops into their product lineup to generate sales. 
This was done either through original research and development,108
outright purchases of technologies or smaller companies, joint devel-
opment arrangements, or technology licensing.109 Eventually, genetic 
science began to dominate certain crop segments such as soybeans,110
and farmers began to view it as necessary to enjoy substantial yields. 
 When agricultural biotechnology was in its infancy, only a few re-
searchers and firms were involved in patenting their inventions.111 As 
interest grew and it was perceived as an integral technology for the 
                                                                                                                    
 104. See supra notes 27-37 (describing the biotechnology-related science of biofuels). 
 105. See sources cited supra note 51. However, the research undertaken for this Article 
suggests the patent environment is strongly characterized by enzyme-related companies. 
See supra note 50 and accompanying figure (charting patents resulting from a search for 
patents related to cellulosic ethanol production). 
 106. See Margie Patlak, Beyond Discovery: Designer Seeds (2003), 
http://www.beyonddiscovery.org/content/view.txt.asp?a=167 (describing the development of 
basic agricultural genetic science and highlighting its university origins in the context of a 
National Academy of Sciences-produced series of foundational stories).
 107. See, e.g., CHARLES, supra note 46, at 1-23 (providing a detailed and conversational 
account of Monsanto’s growing interest in biotechnology techniques for manipulating 
plants); Biotechnology Research: Weighing the Options for a New Public-Private Balance,
AGRIC. OUTLOOK, Oct. 1999, at 22 (“[I]t is increasingly evident that a sizable share of what 
was once considered exotic basic science . . . is being conducted in the private sphere by 
large life science firms, such as Novartis, Monsanto, DuPont, and Celera, and by many 
smaller biotech companies.”); James H. Moore, Transaction Costs, Trust and Property 
Rights as Determinants of Organizational, Industrial and Technological Change: A Case 
Study in the Life Sciences Sector (1998) (on file with authors). 
 108. Biotechnology Research, supra note 107, at 22. 
 109. JOHN L. KING, CONCENTRATION AND TECHNOLOGY IN AGRICULTURAL INPUT 
INDUSTRIES 9-11 (2001), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib763/ 
aib763.pdf; Michael R. Ward, Emerging Competition Policy Issues in Agricultural Biotech-
nology, 44 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 504, 515-20 (2000). 
 110. FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO & MCBRIDE, supra note 46, at 4 (“Herbicide-tolerant soy-
bean[] . . . [u]se expanded to about 17 percent of the soybean acreage in 1997, to 56 percent 
in 1999, and to 68 percent in 2001.”). 
 111. KING, supra note 109, at 6. 
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future of the agricultural industry, more entities filed for patent pro-
tection.112 For a time, the patent landscape became quite diverse. But 
a wave of consolidation soon swept the industry. Large companies 
like Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta began buying smaller compa-
nies to create large portfolios of patented technologies.113 It was well 
known that they sought power, in part, through the ownership of key 
intellectual property assets. Consolidation was an important means 
of obtaining more control. Other players with connections to the 
pharmaceutical field, such as Novartis and Aventis, were also in-
volved at various stages.114 Most of these efforts resulted in either 
spin-offs, such as Bayer Crop Sciences, or the agricultural biotech-
nology assets being sold to one of the top four firms.115 Eventually, a 
few companies once again dominated the patent landscape.116
 The upside to the wave of consolidation is that the industry is now 
relatively compartmentalized. There are certainly a number of pa-
tent lawsuits among the big companies,117 but there is little evidence 
that small parties or patent trolls are creating holdups in biotechnol-
ogy development in general.118 The potential for patent thickets  
has been significantly reduced. Interestingly, there has not been a 
great deal of resistance to these arrangements by antitrust authori-
                                                                                                                    
 112. See John H. Barton & Peter Berger, Patenting Agriculture, 17 ISSUES SCI. & TECH.
43, 44-45 (2001) (describing several historical and legal events that led to a surge in pa-
tents on agricultural biotechnology). 
 113. KING, supra note 109, at 9-11. 
 114. Id. at 11.
 115. Id. at 7 fig.3. 
 116. The USDA’s Economic Research Service has provided a dramatic illustration of 
the consolidation trend in agricultural biotechnology patents by graphing patent owner-
ship with and without consolidation figured in. See USDA-ERS Patent Consolidation, su-
pra note 98. 
 117. A search of Westlaw’s LitAlert database finds that Monsanto, Syngenta, and Pio-
neer Hi-Bred have been involved in forty-seven patent cases filed since August 2005. 
 118. The biotechnology industry’s primary lobbying organization, the Biotechnology 
Industry Organization (BIO), issued a report in 2008 on pending patent reform litigation in 
which it addressed the existence of trolls. ANN MILLS & PATTI TERESKERZ, BIOTECHNOLOGY 
INDUS. ORG., PROPOSED PATENT REFORM LEGISLATION: LIMITATIONS OF EMPIRICAL DATA 
USED TO INFORM THE PUBLIC POLICY DEBATE 20 (2008), available at http://bio.org/ip/ 
domestic/UVA_Limitations_of_Empirical_Data.pdf. It found that there was essentially no 
empirical evidence of trolls in major studies that motivated patent reform. Id. The most in-
teresting highlight was of a survey by Walsh et al. of biomedical researchers that asked 
about the reasons for project abandonment. Id. at 17-18. “Too many patents” was a concern 
cited by only three percent of respondents. Id. Notably, Michael Heller rejects Walsh’s find-
ings by asserting that scientists are not aware of the effects of the anticommons. See
HELLER, supra note 53, at 66-67, 77. He seems to suggest, in the face of survey evidence 
that contradicts his theory, that no survey can effectively capture the anticommons due to 
a variety of inherent biases or incomplete information. See Damien Geradin et al., The 
Complements Problem Within Standard Setting: Assessing the Evidence on Royalty Stack-
ing, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 144, 159 (2008) (“[V]oluntary market-based solutions appear 
capable of handling most of the licensing issues arising from any [anticommons] problems.”). 
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ties,119 though as discussed below, the possibility of anticompetitive 
behavior looms. 
 Given the similarities in technology, one predicts that biofuels will 
follow the general model of agricultural biotechnology. But this is on-
ly the starting point for the analysis. There are differences that may 
play an important role in charting a slightly different future for bio-
fuels. For example, biofuels are part of a national energy policy,120 the 
core field of biotechnology has developed substantially since its in-
fancy in the early 1980s, and smaller entities like universities are 
becoming much more savvy about owning intellectual property.121 At 
the very least, these differences suggest that, although the future in-
tellectual property environment of biofuels is greatly informed by 
analogies to agricultural biotechnology, it is worth more in-depth 
study to ascertain the true likelihood of consolidation. To predict con-
solidation, one must have an appreciation of the possible pathways 
as well as the facilitating factors. 
B.   Beneficial Ordering Mechanisms 
 There are a number of possible iterations for ordering the biofuel 
innovation environment. Such ordering may involve the buying and 
selling of intellectual property rights to create permanent changes in 
the landscape. Alternatively, it may be brought about by some kind 
of licensing structure. The best form depends entirely on the owner 
and the technology. In fact, a broad patent environment may actually 
contain aspects of several ordering mechanisms, and the composition 
may change over time.  
 It is important to understand that the mechanisms of private or-
dering described below are by no means new or unusual; in various 
forms, they have long been essential tools in the management of in-
tellectual property.122 What is different is a perspective on these 
transactions as a method of large-scale private reorganization of the 
                                                                                                                    
 119. In general, antitrust authorities have acquiesced to the agricultural biotechnology 
industry mergers and licensing arrangements with only the requirement that certain as-
sets be divested. See, e.g., Novartis AG, Docket No. C-3979 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Dec. 15, 
2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/novartisd_o.pdf (approving, in a consent 
decree, the merger of crop sciences divisions that now exist as Syngenta). 
 120. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 
202, 121 Stat. 1492, 1521-22 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545) (dictating an increasing 
percentage of biofuel in transportation fuel through 2022). 
 121. See Lemley, Patent Trolls, supra note 74, at 614-15. 
 122. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 12-13 (2004) (describing 
the emergence of the business of invention in the 1800s predicated on the ability to sell  
patents, engage in joint ventures, and so on). Kieff and Paredes have considered the pri-
vate ordering solution from the perspective of the conditions that must exist for an indi-
vidual deal to take place rather than the conditions relevant for an entire industry. See 
generally Kieff & Paredes, supra note 101. Their analysis fits within the broader frame-
work of this Article. 
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intellectual property environment. Through these various tech-
niques, a field that was once crowded, impenetrable, and unproduc-
tive can become efficient. 
1.   Vertical Consolidation 
 In a highly fractioned patent environment, one company may 
struggle to gain access to sufficient patent rights to be able to market 
a product or deliver a service. Two or more firms may own different 
aspects of an embodiment, creating a barrier to a complete, “vertical” 
integration of rights.123 One company may own a patent-enabling 
technology, another company may have the rights to the commercial 
embodiment, and a third company may control ancillary technology 
necessary to make the invention a commercial success.124 If one firm 
has significant financial resources, the simplest solution to the prob-
lem is to purchase the necessary rights from the others and consoli-
date it into one company. 
FIGURE 2: PRIVATE ORDERING MECHANISMS
 A firm could undertake vertical consolidation by focusing on pur-
chasing or licensing the patent rights and related assets in particu-
lar. It may be a successful strategy if the rights are the only impor-
tant part of the embodiment held by others and if patent owners are 
willing to part with their exclusivity and possibly accompanying 
                                                                                                                    
 123. See Ward, supra note 109, at 513-15. 
 124. Id.
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“know-how.”125 However, it is probably more common and often more 
efficient to purchase the entire segment of a company that owns the 
rights. Along with patents, a purchaser may acquire important busi-
ness management structure and perhaps ancillary intellectual prop-
erty such as trademarks. A distribution chain may also be an impor-
tant advantage in purchasing an established company.126 Because it 
is not always easy to identify the necessary patent rights, complete 
vertical consolidation may take place over a period of years as the 
owners become clear. 
 Vertical consolidation will generally not present an antitrust prob-
lem because the owners of the rights are not in competition with each 
other (at least in the context of the invention in question).127 None of 
the patent owners can market a product due to the holdout powers of 
the others. There is technically no competition to stifle. Therefore, 
the consolidation creates an overall competitive benefit because it al-
lows something new on the market—technology that would not oth-
erwise be available—that may compete with existing technology.  
For the same reasons, vertical integration in and of itself is generally 
good for overall technology development and can increase  
public welfare. 
2.   Joint Ventures and Cross-Licensing 
 When the patent environment is less dispersed, it might be possi-
ble to identify one or two technology owners who could combine their 
property and knowledge to make a complete product. Again, there 
may be synergies in corporate know-how in addition to complementa-
ry inventions. In such cases, it might be possible to bring the intellec-
tual property owners together to create a joint venture.128 This has 
the advantage of permitting each entity to retain ownership and a 
stake in the technology it developed. Beyond a certain number of in-
tellectual property owners, however, this mechanism is probably  
not workable. 
                                                                                                                    
 125. See RICHARD RAZGAITIS, EARLY-STAGE TECHNOLOGIES: VALUATION AND PRICING
12 (1999) (discussing “outright sale agreements” for intellectual property and the fact that 
they are often accompanied by know-how, related machinery, and even relevant employees). 
 126. Professor Ward provides the example of Monsanto’s acquisition of Dekalb, noting 
that it “married Monsanto’s proprietary biotechnology intellectual property with Dekalb’s 
highly complementary existing presence in seed markets.” Ward, supra note 109, at 513. 
 127. Id. at 513-14 (noting the efficiencies of vertical consolidation); see also DOJ/FTC 
1995 GUIDELINES, supra note 102, at 31 (discussing the FTC and DOJ analysis of intellec-
tual property acquisition). 
 128. See Joseph Kattan, Antitrust Analysis of Technology Joint Ventures: Allocative Ef-
ficiency and the Rewards of Innovation, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 937, 938-41 (1993) (describing 
the general purpose of most joint ventures). 
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 Joint ventures are extremely common in agricultural biotechnolo-
gy in the context of genetically modified seeds.129 Often, a large agri-
business may purchase a percentage of a smaller agribusiness in or-
der to combine existing technologies and work to create new prod-
ucts. A recent example is GreenLeaf Genetics, a joint venture be-
tween DuPont and Sygenta to out-license corn and soybean genetics 
and traits.130 For the most part, joint ventures can avoid antitrust 
scrutiny so long as they do not excessively concentrate market pow-
er.131 If it appears that the venture is actually a kind of market-
cornering merger or, worse, an agreement not to compete on existing 
technologies, the joint venture can quickly lead to legal problems.132
 Although a joint venture can be a significant way of facilitating 
the creation of otherwise stalled products by utilizing a transformed, 
hybrid corporate entity, many of the same advantages can be 
achieved by licensing. Achieving these advantages is particularly 
likely if there is a certain type of technology that is applicable to 
many products, but a deeper relationship with the technology owner 
is not advantageous.133 Licensing has elements of standard-setting 
practice, but it is the product of two-party negotiation. In the context 
of agricultural biotechnology, one of the best examples is Roundup-
Ready® genetically modified crops. This technology is owned by 
Monsanto but is incorporated into the seeds of some of its strongest 
competitors, including DuPont (Pioneer Hi-Bred)134 and Syngenta.135
It has become a very successful, widely-adopted genetically modified 
(GM) agricultural technology.136
                                                                                                                    
 129. KING, supra note 109, at 9-10; Ward, supra note 109, at 518. 
 130. Monsanto Gets Competitor in Syngenta Joint Venture, ST. LOUIS BUS. J., Apr. 11, 
2006, http://www.stlouis.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/2006/04/10/daily11.html. 
 131. See DOJ/FTC 1995 GUIDELINES, supra note 102, at 10-13 (discussing general 
principles of assessing intellectual property collaborations in innovation markets, which is 
where joint ventures generally take place); see also SCOTCHMER, supra note 122, at  
172-74 (discussing analysis of antitrust effects of mergers and joint ventures from an inno-
vation perspective). 
 132. See DOJ/FTC 1995 GUIDELINES, supra note 102, at 8-10 (providing an example 
where competitors form a joint venture to eliminate competition in licensing a process for 
manufacturing a drug, and noting that it could reduce competition). 
 133. However, the level of integration is closely related to whether the license is exclu-
sive or nonexclusive. Exclusive licenses—wherein two companies are linked to the exclu-
sion of other competitors—necessarily create more antitrust issues. See KING, supra note 
109, at 10; Ward, supra note 109, at 519. 
 134. Monsanto and DuPont Modify Roundup Ready License Agreement, CHEMWEEK 
BUS. DAILY, Sept. 21, 2007 (“DuPont will pay Monsanto approximately $91 million/year 
over 2008-2015 for a total fee of $725 million, which DuPont says lowers its royalty pay-
ments by about 30% compared to its previous per-acre agreement.”). 
 135. Press Release, Monsanto, Monsanto and Syngenta Reach Royalty-Bearing Licens-
ing Agreement on Roundup Ready 2 Yield Soybean Technology (May 23, 2008), available at
http://monsanto.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=604. 
 136. See Theodore M. Crosbie et al., Plant Breeding: Past, Present, and Future, in
PLANT BREEDING: THE ARNEL R. HALLAUER INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 19-26 (Kendall  
R. Lamkey & Michael Lee eds., 2006) (detailing a discussion, largely authored by Monsan-
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3.   Patent Pooling 
 A patent-pooling structure is another step back in commitment 
and coordination from consolidation and joint ventures. It involves a 
licensing entity that administers several pieces of patent property in 
order to provide broad access to a number of companies.137 Compa-
nies can usually access the protected information for licensed pur-
poses in exchange for the payment of a set royalty.138 The strategy of 
pooling is explicitly a response to patent holdups.139 Once formed, pa-
tent pools induce wide participation as they present a level playing 
ground for all manufacturers (which is also a barrier to a patent 
pool’s initial formation by companies desiring to exploit an intellec-
tual property advantage). 
 Pooling arrangements are more common in high technology elec-
tronics; however, there are examples of agricultural pools. One such 
pool that has received a great deal of attention is the pool for the ge-
netic material necessary to produce Golden Rice.140 Another is the 
Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA), a col-
laboration of universities and nonprofit institutions in several com-
panies to make a variety of biotech innovations available.141
 Patent pools are generally voluntary collaborations between 
knowing competitors.142 However, it may be possible to compel par-
ties to join the pool or risk losing revenue from a large segment of the 
industry.143 They are strongly linked to standards for obvious rea-
                                                                                                                    
to employees, and describing the immense success of Roundup Ready products,  
especially soybeans). 
 137. Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of 
Patent Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION 
POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 123, 129 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 
2001); Shapiro, supra note 79, at 134. 
 138. Merges, supra note 137, at 123, 129. 
 139. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 64 (2007) 
[hereinafter FTC/DOJ 2007 REPORT] (“Patents pools also help to mitigate the ‘hold up’ and 
‘hold out’ problems that can sometimes stymie industry efforts to make a product that con-
forms to an industry standard.”); Shapiro, supra note 79, at 134. 
 140. David Serafino, Survey of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and 
Management Structures 30-31 (Knowledge Ecology Int’l (KEI) Research Note 2007:6, 
2007), available at www.keionline.org/misc-docs/ds-patentpools.pdf. 
 141. Id. at 32-33. 
 142. See Shapiro, supra note 79, at 134.
 143. See Alan Cohen, Patent Pools’ Big Splash, IP L. & BUS., Feb. 16, 2005, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1108389913560 (“Pools can be structured to fix pric-
es, stifle competition, discourage innovation, or divide markets. Yet increasingly, going it 
alone is a luxury companies just don’t have.”); IGWG Briefing Paper on Patent Pools: Col-
lective Management of Intellectual Property – The Use of Patent Pools to Expand Access to 
Essential Medical Technologies (Knowledge Ecology Int’l (KEI) Research Note 2007:3, 
2007), available at www.keionline.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=65 
(asserting that a 1917 aircraft manufacturers patent pool was essentially compelled 
“against the backdrop of legislation threatening to compulsory license the patents”). 
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sons.144 Manufacturers may set out to identify relevant intellectual 
property and either purchase it for the pool or invite the owners to 
get involved. This coordinated effort may have the effect of cutting 
short the plans of a prospective patent troll. 
 As with consolidation and joint ventures, patent pools can avoid 
antitrust scrutiny under many circumstances.145 The government 
may weigh in on the legality of the pool, although it is not required, 
as in the case of an outright merger of assets.146 Most important is 
that pooled patents not consist of pure substitutes such that the pool 
necessarily represents a reduction in competition.147 More generally, 
the pool must have procompetitive effects and not stand as a barrier 
to research and development.148 When a patent pool is clearly ameli-
orating the effects of a patent thicket, the procompetitive case is rela-
tively easy to make.149
4.   Standard Setting 
 When firms perceive efficiency in adopting the same technological 
standard, a group effort—usually through an industry standard-
setting organization (SSO)150—may develop to sort out the 
attributes.151 Unlike patent pooling, this group effort can take place 
before intellectual property rights in an area have been perfected. In 
many respects, standard setting can be viewed as the antithesis of 
patent pooling in that the effort may be directed specifically to avoid
existing and future intellectual property152 (though a standard may 
incorporate a pool).153 Often, technology parameters are chosen spe-
cifically because they are not subject to patent rights.154 In this man-
ner, a standard can transform the intellectual property environment 
                                                                                                                    
 144. Merges, supra note 137, at 151 (“Even where there is no formal requirement along 
these lines, past practice exerts a powerful influence: having seen standards coalesce into 
pools, consumer electronics companies may simply expect this as the natural progression.”). 
 145. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 79, at 134-35 (discussing the Department of Justice’s 
pronouncements on two permitted patent pools for DVD and MPEG technology). 
 146. See Clayton Act § 7A, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000) (providing the Hart-Scott-Rodino re-
quirement for the filing of a notification of an intent to merge with the FTC and DOJ). 
 147. FTC/DOJ 2007 REPORT, supra note 139, at 74-77. 
 148. Id. at 67. 
 149. See generally Gavin Clarkson & David DeKorte, The Problem of Patent Thickets in 
Convergent Technologies, 1093 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 180 (2006) (arguing that the pres-
ence of a thicket weighs heavily in favor of permitting a particular patent pool). 
 150. FTC/DOJ 2007 REPORT, supra note 139, at 33-34. 
 151. Id. at 33. 
 152. See Lemley, Ten Things, supra note 60, at 154-55 (“[I]f a patent owner shows up 
in the standard-setting process after the irreversible investment is made, the investments 
have been made not just by one manufacturer but by everyone in the industry.”). 
 153. Merges, supra note 137, at 151. 
 154. FTC/DOJ 2007 REPORT, supra note 139, at 41. However, it is often difficult to 
avoid patent rights, as they may not be evident when the standard is being set. Lemley, 
Ten Things, supra note 60, at 154. 
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by conferring or eliminating the market value that is the source of 
the asset’s power. 
 In the agricultural biotechnology field, one finds standards pri-
marily in safety and field-of-use guidelines. Prominent examples ex-
ist in the context of the push for organic farming and labeling for ge-
netically modified crops. A regulatory structure for the former was 
imposed in 2002 under the National Organic Program, administered 
by the USDA.155 However, the latter is subject to industry determina-
tions of when labeling is appropriate. 
 It is possible to engage in de facto standard setting through the ef-
fects of network economics. A particular product may become viable 
only if it is integrated into a larger infrastructure, and the integra-
tion of one product may preclude the introduction of another.156 This 
is a well-established issue in the context of biofuels. Some fuel 
sources would require significant changes in traditional aspects of re-
fueling infrastructure157 or automobile manufacturing158 to receive 
widespread adoption. Changes to support such fuels may prejudice 
the adoption of others that might require an alternative design in 
vehicles or services. The voluntary industry adoption of one  
design over another has essentially the same effect as an agreed 
upon standard. 
C.   Conditions for Effective Private Ordering 
 Given the existence of so many useful and legal methods of pri-
vate ordering, why is it that some industries seem to be unable to or-
ganize in this manner? For example, it is well known that computer-
related industries consider the threat from patent “trolls” and other 
forms of unproductive litigation to be so severe that they actually de-
sire weaker patent rights.159 Clearly, private ordering has not oc-
curred to the extent desired160 (though there have been some large 
scale attempts),161 and there is the belief that some technological ad-
                                                                                                                    
 155. 7 C.F.R. § 205.100 (2008). 
 156. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 60, at 523. 
 157. See generally GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (GAO), BIOFUELS: DOE LACKS A 
STRATEGIC APPROACH TO COORDINATE INCREASING PRODUCTION WITH INFRASTRUCTURE 
DEVELOPMENT AND VEHICLE NEEDS (2007). 
 158. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
 159. Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of 
Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1829-32 (2007) (suggesting conditions, which are 
more common in computer-related industries, that permit patent trolls to wreak havoc). 
 160. WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PATENT REFORM: ISSUES IN THE 
BIOMEDICAL AND SOFTWARE INDUSTRIES, Report No. RL33367, at 9-10 (2006), available at
http://fas.org/sgp//crs/misc/RL33367.pdf (“In addition, ownership of these patents may well 
be fractured among hundreds or thousands of different individuals and firms.”). 
 161. Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of 
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 831-32 (2008) (describing the distribution of free 
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vancement has been held up.162 On the other hand, the pharmaceuti-
cal industry has generally been able to organize and consolidate in a 
manner that maximizes the benefits of intellectual property protec-
tion.163 This is not to say that substantial litigation does not exist in 
consolidated industries, but rather that the participants generally 
believe that intellectual property rights do not create a barrier to in-
novation and are necessary research and development incentives.  
 It is possible that the likelihood of private ordering is an immuta-
ble characteristic of particular industries. Only if the industry struc-
ture and the nature of the technology in question are favorable can 
private ordering occur. Otherwise, it will be nearly impossible for 
private actors to rearrange ownership rights in such a manner as to 
produce an efficient system for innovation. A student of law and eco-
nomics will see this as an issue of transaction costs,164 and indeed it 
is to a great extent. In essence, barriers to negotiation prevent the ef-
ficient ordering of rights through licensing and sales. It is therefore 
useful to consider the specific conditions that promote ordering. 
 A basic knowledge of patent transactions, industry structure, and 
essential technology allows one to intuit private ordering conditions 
with relative ease. The primary factors are first and foremost tied to 
technology, but they also depend on general industry practices. Not-
ably, these factors clearly distinguish those technologies in which pa-
tent thickets are believed to pose the greatest problem. 
1.   Limited Number of Patents 
 In order for consolidation of patent assets to be a reasonable op-
tion, a firm or consortium of firms must have the ability to get a 
grasp on which patents might impact a particular technological em-
bodiment. It is common sense that one can assess the value and ne-
cessity of purchasing patent rights only if one has some idea of the 
patent universe. But in many circumstances, assessing a patent un-
iverse can actually be quite difficult. If related rights can come from 
                                                                                                                    
software as a means of avoiding the problems of diffused property rights); Don Clark, Wi-
MAX Patent Pool Is Planned, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2008, at B6. 
 162. SCHACHT, supra note 160, at 10 (“In industries where innovation is sequential and 
complementary, as with software and computers, some experts argue that strong patents 
interfere with the innovation process.”). 
 163. See Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent Trolls: The Di-
vergent Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 689, 693 (2006) (“Large 
biotechnology, medical, and pharmaceutical companies (biotech/pharma) do not face the 
same threat that their info-tech counterparts face. This lack of cohesiveness has likely de-
layed or prevented the passage of some of the proposed patent reforms.”). 
 164. See, e.g., Garadin et al., supra note 118, at 154 (“Industry participants have 
tended to view rights dispersion in the single digits as concentrated and thus not proble-
matic, primarily because transaction costs typically do not prohibit bilateral negotiations 
when a limited number of firms are involved.”). 
2009]                          PRIVATE ORDERING 447 
a practically unlimited number of sources directed at a tremendous 
variety of different product attributes, then even a diligent research-
er may find it impossible to discover all potential infringements.165
Additionally, the danger increases every day with the issuance of 
new patents. Therefore, for private ordering to be a reasonable possi-
bility, the number of patents per product must be limited. 
 The pharmaceutical industry is often cited as an example of a 
field in which the number of patents covering a product is limited.166
Although the industry is far from a one-patent, one-product model, it 
is certainly not unusual for the number of patents that impact a par-
ticular good to be in the single digits.167 If one wished to license or 
purchase the rights to a given drug, it would be relatively easy to fig-
ure out which patents are involved. Moreover, it is quite likely that 
one company would own most (if not all) such patents, making the 
transaction significantly easier. On the other hand, in the computer-
related fields, the number of patents that can read on aspects of a 
product could be in the hundreds, or even thousands.168 Even a single 
piece of software installed on a computing device could be covered by 
dozens of patents. This makes comprehensive licensing difficult. 
Even technology licensed through patent pools offers no guarantee 
that infringement will be conclusively avoided.169
 Another consideration may be the number of patents that tend to 
populate the entire technology space. Patent environments can be 
said to have a “density” that is formed by the web of interconnected 
patents.170 Where there is a great deal of invention related to several 
popular technologies, the space quickly becomes denser. The density 
may, in and of itself, make it more difficult to ascertain the existence 
of patent rights and lead to product development that blindly tres-
passes on the rights of others. For this reason, it is fair to suggest 
that less dense patent environments favor private ordering. 
                                                                                                                    
 165. See Sterk, supra note 85, at 1298-99. 
 166. See Thomas, supra note 163, at 730 (“Biotech/pharma’s . . . business model  
is based on selling products to end users that embody one or a very limited number  
of patents . . . .”). 
 167. For example, some posit that in the pharmaceutical industry, “generally, one pa-
tent covers one drug.” Lemley, Ten Things, supra note 60, at 150. That is an exaggeration, 
but the number of patents is often in the single or low double digits. See Daniel R. Cahoy, 
Patent Fences and Constitutional Fence Posts: Property Barriers to Pharmaceutical Impor-
tation, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 623, 632 n.26 (2005). 
 168. Lemley, Ten Things, supra note 60, at 151 (“In IT, however, one product regularly 
involves the combination of 50, 100, even 1000, or—as Intel lawyers themselves say with 
respect to their own core microprocessor—5000 different patent rights.”). 
 169. See, e.g., Olga Kharif, The Currents in an RFID Pool, BUS. WK., Aug. 10, 2005, 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/aug2005/tc20050810_7703_tc024.htm 
(quoting an industry member who states that there is no guarantee that all essential pa-
tent holders will participate in the RFID pool). 
 170. Clarkson & DeKorte, supra note 149, at 180. 
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 As suggested earlier, there are reasons to believe that second-
generation biofuels will be more like pharmaceuticals than like com-
puter-related technologies. The patent space does not appear to be 
huge,171 and the nature of the technology—methods and materials for 
producing a single chemical compound for use as a fuel—would be 
less likely to read on multiple patents. One could predict that biofu-
els will meet the first criteria for private ordering. 
2.   Significant R&D Barriers to Entry 
 Another aspect that tends to make a patent environment more in-
clined toward order is the existence of significant research and devel-
opment costs for relevant innovation. If a company must invest a 
great deal in basic materials, research expertise, or time to an inven-
tion, smaller players will tend to be kept at bay.172 By virtue of the 
smaller field, it is easier for ordering companies to devise an efficient 
strategy. A smaller field also reduces the chances that new players 
will simply pop up to claim ownership over an aspect of a product or 
process that another company is commercializing.173 It should be rel-
atively easy to identify almost all of the potential entrants. Moreover, 
significant research and development barriers may mean that even 
large, well-funded companies will be reluctant to begin parallel pro-
grams rather than purchase or license those already in existence.  
 Each of the three major segments of biofuel research is likely to 
have a significant barrier to entry, but not necessarily for the same 
reasons. The design and production of both enzymes and ethanolo-
gens is, for the most part, a typical biotechnology research cost bar-
rier. To some extent, enzymes and ethanologens may operate syner-
gistically such that a company that has an expertise in one is likely 
to have a great advantage in the other.174 For example, a particular 
                                                                                                                    
 171. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. The relatively broad search uncovered 
only about 200 patents since 1988. 
 172. Cf. Long, supra note 90, at 45 (“The cost of much innovation in software today is 
relatively low when compared with the cost required by other industries, which means that 
independent inventors do not need the resources of large firms to invent products  
or processes.”). 
 173. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organiza-
tions, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1952-53 (2002) (noting that patents in industries like pharma-
ceuticals, biotechnology, and chemistry are harder to obtain and less likely to result  
in holdups). 
 174. See Anthony Crooks, From Grass to Gas: On the Road to Energy Independence, 
How Soon Will Cellulosic Ethanol Be a Factor?, USDA RURAL DEV., Sep. 2006, 
http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rbs/pub/sep06/grass.htm; Ron Kotrba, Incubation Through In-
tegration, ETHANOL PRODUCER MAG., Mar. 2006, http://www.ethanolproducer.com/article-
print.jsp?article_id=1881 (discussing Broin’s attempt to integrate research that impacts 
various stages of the ethanol production process); Dep’t of Energy (DOE), Biomass Pro-
gram: Past Solicitations, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/biomass/printable_versions/ 
past_solicitations.html (last visited June 1, 2009) (indicating that Verenium is developing 
both enzymes and ethanologens).  
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enzyme may produce a type of sugar that is optimally converted to 
fuel by a certain microorganism. Coordinating these efforts has ob-
vious advantages. 
 Biofuel plant technology can share many of the R&D attributes of 
enzymes and ethanologens, at least in the context of genetic modifi-
cations. But an additional issue is the time it takes to grow plant va-
rieties in test plots. Many companies ameliorate these concerns by 
testing in climates that allow at least three growing cycles per 
year.175 Compared to the extremely short doubling times for bacterial 
populations,176 this is still quite lengthy. The time ends up being a 
significant additional barrier to the cost of materials and research 
expertise, effectively putting some plant technologies out of reach for 
all but the most established firms. 
3.   Existence of Complementing/Synergistic Infrastructure and 
Technology  
 One of the main reasons a company might choose to purchase or 
license another’s technology is the existence of synergies. This is par-
ticularly true when that technology may impact part of a product or 
service that depends on the continued use of existing technologies for 
success. A new product attribute tacked onto an existing distribution 
network is an example of such synergy. It has been demonstrated in 
the context of the pharmaceutical industry that this is one of the 
most important factors underlying mergers.177 Of course, buyouts of 
unrelated technologies undoubtedly occur to accomplish goals such as 
gaining a foothold in an emerging market.178 But the potential for 
synergy acts at least as an accelerant, making it an important factor 
in whether private ordering will occur. 
 As previously stated, biofuel technology is not developed to the ex-
tent that one can conclusively determine what aspects truly exhibit 
synergy. However, the potential certainly exists. One can presume 
that natural connections between enzymes and ethanologens as de-
scribed above could be important. Technology synergies may be more 
likely to occur when firms in established areas such as ethanol pro-
duction or fuel transport have the opportunity to combine with firms 
that are on the cutting edge of a new line of research, like cellulosic 
                                                                                                                    
 175. Conversation with Tom Richard, Assoc. Professor, Dep’t of Agric. and Biological 
Eng’g, Pa. State Univ. (Jul. 8, 2008). 
 176. ARTHUR KOCH, BACTERIAL GROWTH AND FORM 35 (2001) (“[S]ome bacteria under 
favorable conditions can double every 15 min.”). 
 177. Patricia M. Danzon et al., Mergers and Acquisitions in the Pharmaceutical and 
Biotech Industries, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 307, 319 (2007) (noting that one 
company’s excess capacity due to patent expiration or other product sales declines is highly 
correlated with mergers). 
 178. See Ward, supra note 109, at 517. 
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conversion. And in plant sciences, a company’s technology for high 
yields through insect and herbicide resistance179 would strongly com-
plement another’s technology for facilitating the conversion from cel-
lulose to fuel. More to the point, synergistic alliances are already oc-
curring. Verenium, one of the more prominent biofuel companies, is a 
merger between the enzyme company Diversa and cellulosic ethanol 
processing company Celunol.180 This creates at least a reasonable 
presumption that there is a sufficient amount of synergy and  
complementing technology to support ordering of the firms’ respec-
tive technologies.
4.   Long-Term Market for Technology 
 A final important factor in facilitating ordering is the likelihood 
that licensed or purchased technology will remain useful long enough 
to justify the investment in consolidation. In fast-moving fields, 
where technologies may become obsolete in a matter of two or three 
years,181 making the effort to survey the field and engineer complex 
mergers may not make much sense. However, if such consolidations 
are likely to lead to research collaborations that pay off for decades, 
the effort is clearly supported.  
 The length of the market is impacted by consumer preference, ob-
viously, but it is also influenced by a number of other factors that are 
not as subject to whim. Lengthy product development times may 
make it less likely that truly game-changing technologies stand 
ready to overtake the market in a short time period.182 To the extent 
that the marketing of a technology entails the use of a standard 
agreed upon by many industry players, it is unlikely to change from 
year to year.183 In addition, the presence of switching costs may delay 
or forestall the emergence of alternative technologies.184
 In this matter, there is no great question on biofuels. The very fact 
that major breakthroughs are not predicted to occur for years into 
                                                                                                                    
 179. For example, Monsanto’s Roundup-Ready® herbicide resistance technology, see 
supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text, would provide significant advantages in the 
production of plants with other biofuel-related genetic modifications. 
 180. Martin LaMonica, Biofuels Firms Diversa, Celunol Merge, CNETNEWS.COM, Feb. 
12, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/Biofuels-firms-Diversa,-Celunol-merge/2100-11746_3-
6158486.html; Press Release, Verenium, Diversa and Celunol Complete Merger to Create 
Verenium Corporation, a Leader in the Emerging Biofuels Industry (June 20, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.biotech.ufl.org/news/Celunol_DiversaBecomeVerenium21Jun07.pdf. 
 181. Cahoy, supra note 39, at 612 n.98 (describing the diminished value in patents 
when short product life cycles characterize the market). 
 182. For example, consider the fact that pharmaceutical product development times 
may extend to a decade or more. Gerald Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 192-93 (1999) 
(providing a “New Medicines Timeline” that depicts lengthy product development times). 
 183. Lemley, Ten Things, supra note 60, at 154-55. 
 184. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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the future185 suggests that this is a technology segment with very 
lengthy development times. Analogies to general agricultural bio-
technology support this presumption. In addition, the cost of pilot 
plants, not to mention full-scale production facilities,186 means that it 
is unlikely that new technologies will emerge as market competitors 
in a short period of time. It is a well-supported notion that whatever 
second-generation biofuel technologies emerge as dominant will not 
change substantially over the short run. 
D.   The Danger of Horizontal Consolidation 
 To this point, it has been useful to consider consolidation in a pos-
itive light. The ability to navigate conflicting intellectual property 
rights addresses the initial concern of innovation holdup. However, 
consolidation can have a negative side. If the concentration of rights 
leads to a state wherein competition is suppressed or eliminated, the 
pathway to innovation that was anticipated to be cleared could in 
fact be shunted off course. 
 The negative form of concentration is what one might call “hori-
zontal” consolidation.187 Under this model, one company purchases 
intellectual property that covers competing products (or even the 
company owning competing property). Rather than marketing both 
products, efficiency generally dictates that the company eliminates 
one. Note that this is a different situation than a purchase to create 
synergies; it involves an acquisition that is primarily directed at a 
market competitor. Theoretically, this kind of consolidation can be 
positive when there is a need to coalesce around a single technology 
or standard for some efficiency reason, which could even have a com-
petition-enhancing function.188 But that would appear to be the ex-
ception rather than the rule, and it is particularly rare when the field 
is still emerging. More commonly, horizontal consolidation eliminates 
competing products to provide a single firm with a greater potential 
to profit. 
 Obviously, horizontal consolidation raises antitrust issues in the 
same manner that horizontal mergers do.189 Regulators may chal-
lenge such asset purchases under some circumstances.190 However, if 
                                                                                                                    
 185. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
 186. EIA, Biofuels, supra note 30 (“Capital costs for a first-of-a-kind cellulosic ethanol 
plant with a capacity of 50 million gallon[s] per year are estimated by one leading producer 
to be $375 million (2005 dollars) . . . , as compared with $67 million for a corn-based plant 
of similar size . . . .”). 
 187. See Ward, supra note 109, at 512-13 (discussing antitrust issues in  
horizontal combinations). 
 188. Id. at 513. 
 189. See DOJ/FTC 1995 GUIDELINES, supra note 102, at 8-10. 
 190. Id. at 31. 
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the purchase does not result in a significant concentration of market 
power, it is unlikely to be challenged.191 For example, if the firms in-
volved control a relatively small percentage of the market and the 
consolidated property will not change the equation at the time of the 
acquisition, it will generally not violate antitrust laws.192 Significant-
ly, the future potential of the property is the reason that this analy-
sis may fall short. The fact that a consolidation of patent rights does 
not result in an immediate increase in market power does not speak 
to the possible loss in future innovation. The elimination of a vigor-
ous competitor may prevent the research, development, and commer-
cialization that would otherwise have built a stronger technology. It 
may even result in the elimination of any commercialization, as the 
purchasing company may have an alternative, less advanced product 
line that can be developed at a lower cost. 
 In the context of biofuels, the horizontal consolidation issue is par-
ticularly ripe. With the unknown potential of second-generation en-
zyme, plant, or ethanologen technology, it is entirely possible that 
several different solutions will arise to the same problems. Robust 
competition and a reasonably fair public vetting is the optimal way of 
determining which technologies are truly the best. But if good alter-
natives are instead purchased and buried, innovation may be severe-
ly compromised. 
IV.   INTEGRATING PRIVATE ORDERING EFFECTS INTO ENERGY POLICY
 If one assumes that the conditions for private intellectual property 
ordering exist in the second-generation biofuel technology arena (or 
in any nascent technology field, for that matter), it is reasonable to 
draft public policy in response. Ignoring the impacts of patent rights 
appears to be the current policy,193 and it goes without saying that 
this is ill-advised considering the increasing influence of patents. On 
the other hand, blindly drafting technology policy from a general un-
derstanding of patents is no better given the great differences that 
can exist in patent environments between technology fields. In doing 
so, one would likely cause more harm than good. An assessment of 
the actual patent landscape for biofuels is essential. But to be truly 
useful and effective, it must model the changes likely to take place in 
the future. Facilitating private ordering with an eye toward eliminat-
ing market failures and permitting private industry to align rational-
ly is the overarching goal. In addition, it is important to apply  
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 192. See FTC/DOJ 2000 GUIDELINES, supra note 103, at 26.  
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GRANTED IN PLANS FOR GLOBAL BIOFUELS MARKET (2007), http://www.iatp.org/iatp/ 
publications.cfm?refid=100449. 
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a forward-looking policy beyond the question of innovation to address 
the broader supposed benefits and harms of this particular  
energy alternative. 
A.   Avoiding Innovation Holdups Through Disclosure 
 To a great extent, the function of private ordering suggests a 
largely laissez-faire approach. A structure that provides the greatest 
support for innovation, while minimizing the problems of holdouts on 
the one hand and horizontal consolidation on the other, is the ob-
vious goal. The best way to achieve this is not a heavy-handed, forced 
pooling policy or greater antitrust scrutiny. It is information. 
 As suggested above, when the conditions are appropriate for pri-
vate ordering, rational companies should bargain to allocate and li-
cense rights effectively.194 However, one barrier to efficient bargain-
ing is the market failure that comes from an information asymme-
try.195 In this case, the fact that a patent applicant or owner knows 
that the claimed invention covers a particular biofuel technology, but 
the commercial entity does not, creates an obvious obstacle to effi-
cient coordination. In fact, it is the classic holdout problem that gives 
rise to patent trolls. Significantly, this can occur even in the midst of 
a consolidated industry (though it should be far less common).  
 A goal of biofuel innovation policy should be to eliminate the last 
vestiges of holdouts by increasing the disclosure of information. This 
should ideally be an ex ante mechanism, which would allow impacted 
companies to fully assess the patent environment before pursuing an 
invention. Essentially, it would involve compelling prospective paten-
tees to stand up and declare the relevance of their inventions to bio-
fuel technology. Although it would be impossible to simply impose 
such a disclosure requirement on the private market, it might be 
possible to facilitate it through federal incentives. Alternative energy 
is one of the more subsidized industrial segments, and it has great 
power over the agricultural industry;196 perhaps these subsidies—
whether tax credits or research grants—could be used as a carrot to 
promote such desired behavior.  
 There is precedent for a federal program that compels intellectual 
property ownership disclosure in exchange for a benefit. In the 
pharmaceutical context, companies that submit a new drug applica-
tion (NDA) must affirmatively disclose to the Food and Drug Admin-
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istration patents that cover the drug.197 A list of the relevant patents 
for each drug is contained in a publication (now in electronic form) 
known colloquially as the “Orange Book.”198 A failure to disclose a pa-
tent does not result in unenforceability, but there are consequences. 
Namely, a NDA owner will lose the ability to delay a generic compet-
itor’s approval through the Hatch-Waxman scheme,199 a right that is 
potentially worth millions of dollars per day.200 While this is not en-
tirely analogous to the kinds of incentives in place for biofuels, it is 
nonetheless a demonstration that a federal disclosure system  
is possible. 
 Alternatively, the rise of standard-setting organizations or patent 
pools in biofuels may provide the opportunity to encourage disclosure 
as a condition for access. Since the recent stir caused by the Rambus 
company’s ability to surreptitiously own patents covering a standard 
it helped promote through an industry organization,201 standard-
setting organizations will likely be much more cautious in requiring 
intellectual property disclosure. This private model will serve the 
same purpose in many instances as a compelled government regulation. 
B.   Social Policy Beyond Innovation Policy 
 Biofuels will provide an opportunity for rural development so long 
as the primary benefits accrue to farmers and forest landowners, to 
small businesses that might stimulate job growth, and to rural com-
munities to the extent that an influx of money will enhance the rural 
service sector. However, with the control of biofuels realigning to 
large agribusinesses through the consolidation of intellectual proper-
ty, there may be a shortfall in the expected benefits. The initial posi-
tive of increased agricultural commodity prices202 may be outweighed 
by problems created by increasingly constrained (i.e., less competi-
tive) markets and limitations in dispersing ethanol production. In 
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the end, consolidation may actually result in a net negative for rural 
development. That fact must be acknowledged, and the entire devel-
opment angle to biofuels must be rethought. 
 According to economic theory, markets need to be competitive to 
maximize efficiencies and to fairly distribute benefits and harms. 
However, in the agrifood system, it has long been the case that profit 
margins are so narrow that horizontal integration is necessary in or-
der to justify investment in research and development. If companies 
such as Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta had not succeeded in con-
solidating the seed industry,203 then the capacity to accumulate profit 
from the agricultural production process may have been constrained, 
and the investments in agricultural biotechnology research and de-
velopment would have been lower. Although this necessary ordering 
has produced social benefits beyond innovation in the form of the ex-
panded use of more benign herbicides and fewer pesticide applica-
tions, the formation of oligopolistic agricultural markets has had 
negative impacts as well. 
 It has been suggested that the flow of agricultural production 
benefits to small farmers is diminished by industry consolidation. 
William Heffernan, for example, argues that farmers have a dimi-
nished decisionmaking capacity in the increasingly concentrated 
field, meaning that fewer are needed every year.204 Essentially, the 
traditional family farmer is being replaced by the large agribusiness, 
and the food system is becoming just like other segments of the econ-
omy.205 Heffernan believes that intellectual property plays a role in 
this due to its tendency to reduce competition in the food system.206
By extension, consolidation of intellectual property interests in bio-
fuel may have the same effects as in general agriculture. 
 One of the best examples of how powerful intellectual property 
rights can impact the interests of farmers concerns Monsanto’s pa-
tents on Roundup-Ready® seeds. Monsanto (and similarly situated 
companies) have a great interest in protecting the innovation embo-
died in each seed.207 In the case of Roundup®, this is a genetic mod-
ification that makes the plant resistant to the herbicide,208 permitting 
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more precise weed control. Protecting this technology is not easy, as 
every single seed is a copy machine that can duplicate the modifica-
tion and allow a farmer to avoid purchasing more seed the next year. 
In order to protect its interests, Monsanto uses a “bag tag” (also 
known as a “seed wrap”209) license that prevents farmers from saving 
seed in subsequent years.210 To date, Monsanto has been successful in 
enforcing its license against individual farmers.211 In doing so, argu-
ably, it has eliminated the tradition of seed saving and changed the 
relationship between farmers and seed companies.212
 Similar to the agrifood system, the biomass that will serve as the 
raw material supply for the biofuel industry will likely be supplied by 
hundreds of thousands of agricultural and forestry landowners. At 
least some policymakers seem to assume that as a result of the 
emerging biofuel sector, some of the same landowners supplying the 
raw materials for the agrifood system will have increased demand for 
their raw material outputs.213 That increased demand will lead to 
higher prices for the farm outputs.214 However, this assumption ig-
nores the fact that farm producers purchase inputs and sell commod-
ities in oligopolistic markets. Because of the limited competition in 
agricultural commodity purchasing and processing, farmers have lit-
tle bargaining power. Since farmers will be marketing their biomass 
in a similar marketplace as the current agricultural commodity sys-
tem, it is unlikely that economic benefits accruing to farmers  
will continue.  
 Experts also contend that to maximize environmental and eco-
nomic benefits, biofuel processing facilities should be geographically 
diffuse and locally owned.215 Due to the bulkiness of the biomass 
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feedstocks, energy efficiencies would be lost during the transporta-
tion to distant processing facilities. Ideally, then, biomass would be 
processed into fuel closer to the areas where the biomass is har-
vested. Furthermore, the economic benefits in the form of job crea-
tion and profit distribution are enhanced when those diffuse produc-
tion facilities are locally owned.216
 Oligopoly in the biofuel sector would not necessarily prevent the 
development of diffuse processing facilities. The major biofuel com-
panies could develop a franchising system for production similar to 
that of petroleum distribution outlets. However, such a franchising 
system is not equivalent to local ownership. Furthermore, the do-
minance of the biofuel markets would most likely serve as a barrier 
to small companies with otherwise promising approaches to produc-
ing biofuels. New entrepreneurial efforts would fail not necessarily 
because they are less efficient, but because they will be seeking to 
enter a market that is not competitive. Since it is unlikely that the 
biofuel processing facilities will be locally owned, the economic bene-
fits will be limited. 
 Policymakers need to consider difficult tradeoffs to achieve both 
environmental and economic benefits from the biofuel economy.  
The current context of private ordering of biofuel intellectual proper-
ty may enhance environmental benefits at the expense of  
economic benefits. 
V.   CONCLUSION
 Although biofuel policy is currently undergoing great scrutiny, po-
licymakers have devoted insufficient attention to the relevant intel-
lectual property environment. Given the fact that the future of this 
important technology resides in cutting edge research and develop-
ment advances, it is very reasonable to assume that patents will play 
an important role. An overview of the current patent ownership 
landscape suggests that it is diverse and fractioned. Following the 
theories of Heller, Eisenberg, and others, one might be concerned 
that an anticommons is in the works, jeopardizing the future viabili-
ty of biofuels. However, using agricultural biotechnology as a guiding 
heuristic, it is predictable that such an anticommons will not occur. 
The pattern of consolidation that has characterized agricultural bio-
technology since the 1990s seems poised to reoccur. In articulating 
the framework and conditions for consolidation, this Article demon-
strates that an anticommons will likely be avoided by private order-
ing of intellectual property rights. An optimal intellectual property 
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policy will take this into account and foster the private market while 
ameliorating market failures that may permit some patent thickets 
to germinate. In addition, the broader impacts of consolidation will 
need to be considered in order to ensure that the interests of stake-
holders beyond industry are not unduly compromised. The conse-
quences of ignoring the impacts of private ordering in energy innova-
tion are great. The potential for years of misdirected energy invest-
ment creates a critical need for such enhanced analysis.  
